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Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge 
Stephen B. Brush* 
Conservationists have advanced various proposals to protect 
farmer knowledge and engender the farmer participation necessary 
for continued crop evolution that generates plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture. These proposals include increasing the 
demand for traditional crops by farmers and consumers,1 enhancing 
the supply of those crops,2 and negotiating a monetary value for crop 
resources.3 While achieving in situ conservation is possible without 
changing farmers’ customary management of crops as common pool 
resources, an alternative approach is to negotiate a contract with 
providers of the resource that involves direct payment and royalties. 
This bioprospecting mechanism implies a change in the customary 
treatment of crop genetic resources as common pool goods and is in 
line with national ownership mandated by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD).4 Until the end of the last century, crop 
genetic resources were managed as public domain goods according to 
a set of practices loosely labeled as “common heritage.” The rise of 
intellectual property for plants, the commercialization of seed, the 
increasing use of genetic resources in crop breeding, and the 
 * Professor, Department of Human and Community Development, University of 
California, Davis. I am grateful to Charles McManis of Washington University School of Law 
for his invitation to participate in the Conference on Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and for his encouragement in the writing. I am likewise 
thankful to Santiago Carrizosa and to Geertrui Van Overwalle for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of the paper. 
 1. Valeria Negri & Nicola Tosti, Phaseolus Genetic Diversity Maintained On-Farm in 
Central Italy, 49 GENETIC RESOURCES & CROP EVOLUTION 511, 518–19 (2002); Margaret E. 
Smith et al., Participatory Plant Breeding with Maize in Mexico and Honduras, 122 
EUPHYTICA 551, 552 (2001). 
 2. MAURICIO R. BELLON, DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF CROP INFRASPECIFIC DIVERSITY ON 
FARMS 1–2 (Economics Program of the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT), Mexico, D.F., Working Paper No. 01-01, 2001). 
 3. Paul J. Ferraro & Agnes Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity, 298 
SCIENCE 1718, 1719 (2002). 
 4. CBD (1992), available at http://www.biodiv.org/convention. 
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declining availability of crop genetic resources have contributed to 
extensive revisions to the common heritage regime. Changes include 
specifying national ownership over genetic resources and use of 
contracts in the movement of resources between countries.  
This article explores the impact of these changes in cradle areas of 
crop domestication, evolution and diversity (Vavilov Centers) where 
farmers continue to grow diverse populations of crops that serve as 
stores of genetic resources and sources for new resources. The 
question posed here is whether protection of traditional knowledge is 
best accomplished through a form of bioprospecting that replaces 
common pool management by private ownership. The article 
addresses two issues relating to the demise of the common heritage 
regime: 
1. What role does common heritage play in the management of 
crop genetic resources? 
2. What steps are available to protect crop genetic resources in 
the public domain and to recognize the stewardship of 
farmers who maintain those resources? 
The article discusses these issues in reference to the flow of 
genetic resources between traditional farming systems of Vavilov 
Centers and the commercial and public crop breeding sectors in 
developed countries.  
I. VAVILOV CENTERS AND THEIR CROP RESOURCES 
The uneven distribution of crop diversity among geographic 
regions was one clue used by nineteenth-century naturalists such as 
Alphonse DeCandolle and Charles Darwin to identify centers of 
domestication for different crops.5 The contrasts between centers of 
origin and other regions where crops are cultivated are still 
impressive. A single province in the Peruvian Andes has more potato 
diversity than all of North America.6 Likewise, the cassava diversity 
found in a single Amerindian village in Guyana has been found to be 
greater than the diversity in core collection of the international gene 
 5. STEPHEN B. BRUSH, FARMERS’ BOUNTY 24 (2004). 
 6. C.F. Quiros et al., Biochemical and Folk Assessment of Variability of Andean 
Cultivated Potatoes, 44 ECON. BOTANY 254, 264–65 (1990). 
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bank of the crop.7 Early in the twentieth century, Nikolai Vavilov 
added a second clue, the presence of wild relatives, to solve the 
problem of locating centers of crops’ origins.8 Vavilov’s 
accomplishment is recognized among crop scientists by the concept 
of a Vavilov Center to designate the geographic regions where a 
particular crop was domesticated and initially evolved under 
cultivation.9 Although the idea of “center” has been debated10 and 
crop centers are redefined according to new data,11 the current 
consensus among crop scientists is that cradle areas of crop 
domestication are identifiable and reasonably well known.12 While 
genetic resources are found in all farming systems, they are 
particularly valuable and abundant in Vavilov Centers. Concern for 
conservation and protection of traditional knowledge associated with 
them is appropriately focused on these centers. Vavilov Centers are 
critical locations for genetic resources of the world’s crops because of 
their on-going processes of crop evolution, such as gene flow 
between wild relatives and cultivated types and decentralized 
selection by farmers.  
Just as uneven distribution reveals origin, it also is evidence of 
diffusion and the fact that farmers and consumers elsewhere are 
beneficiaries of the resources derived from Vavilov Centers. Thus, 
maize and cassava farmers in Africa and Asia rely on crop genetic 
resources that originated in MesoAmerica (maize) and the Amazon 
Basin (cassava); and New World farmers who grow rice, an Asian 
domesticate, or sorghum, from Africa, draw on resources from the 
Old World. The flows of genetic resources in public breeding 
programs, diffusion of improved crops, and commercial seed also 
evidence a contemporary dependence on genetic resources from 
 7. M. Elias et al., Assessment of Genetic Variability in a Traditional Cassava (Manihot 
esculenta Crantz) Farming System, Using AFLP Markers, 85 HEREDITY 219, 226 (2000). 
 8. N.I. Vavilov, The Origin, Variation, Immunity, and Breeding of Cultivated Plants, 13 
CHRONICA BOTANICA 1, 45 (1949/1950). 
 9. JOHN GREGORY HAWKES, THE DIVERSITY OF CROP PLANTS 65 (1983). 
 10. See JACK R. HARLAN, CROPS AND MAN 51 (2d ed. 1992). 
 11. See David L. Lentz et al., Prehistoric Sunflower (Helianthus annuus L.) Domestication 
in Mexico, 55 ECON. BOTANY 370, 374 (2001). 
 12. HAWKES, supra note 9, at 52. 
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Vavilov Centers that is perhaps greater than in times when crop 
diffusion was informal.13  
The flow of crop genetic resources has occurred in different 
spatial and organizational frameworks since the beginning of 
agriculture. Indeed, some crop scientists speculate that domestication 
occurred because the wild ancestors of crops were moved beyond 
their original habitats.14 The diffusion of crops beyond their original 
cradle areas starts with the exchange of seed among farmers and is a 
dominant pattern of crop evolution.15 This diffusion was 
accomplished through the incessant movement of human populations 
and the constant quest for new crops and crop varieties to meet the 
obstacles of crop production and to satisfy the urgings of human 
curiosity and palate. Long before the “Columbian Exchange”16 
connected the Old and New Worlds and before European imperial 
ambitions moved crops here and there,17 the patterns of long-distance 
and trans-continental crop diffusion existed. In the prehistoric New 
World, maize, beans, avocados, and chili pepper, among other crops, 
migrated from MesoAmerica in the Northern Hemisphere to South 
America, and cassava, tomatoes, and tobacco moved in the opposite 
direction. In the prehistoric Old World, wheat, cabbage crops 
(Brassica oleracea) among others moved eastward from the Fertile 
Crescent and the Mediterranean to the far reaches of Asia, while rice 
and stone fruits (e.g., peaches, apricots) moved westward to the 
Atlantic.18 Similar patterns are evident in Africa and Oceania, for 
 13. See generally Robert E. Evenson & Douglas Gollin, Genetic Resources, International 
Organizations, and Improvement in Rice Varieties, 45 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 471 
(1997) (evaluating the effect of international organizations and programs on improvements in 
rice varieties); Cary Fowler et al., Unequal Exchange? Recent Transfers of Agricultural 
Resources and Their Implications for Developing Countries, 19 DEV. POL’Y REV. 181 (2001) 
(examining current patterns of gene flows and finding that developing countries are major net 
recipients of germplasm samples); MELINDA SMALE ET AL., THE DEMAND FOR CROP GENETIC 
RESOURCES (International Food Policy Research Institute, Environment and Production 
Technology Division (EPDT) Discussion Paper No. 82, 2001) (recognizing that germplasm 
samples distributed by the U.S. National Germplasm System favor developing countries). 
 14. HAWKES, supra note 9, at 30. 
 15. LLOYD T. EVANS, CROP EVOLUTION, ADAPTATION AND YIELD 113 (1993). 
 16. ALFRED W. CROSBY, JR., THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF 1492, at 64 (1972). 
 17. LUCILE H. BROCKWAY, SCIENCE AND COLONIAL EXPANSION: THE ROLE OF THE 
BRITISH ROYAL BOTANIC GARDENS 6, 37 (1979). 
 18. JONATHAN D. SAUER, HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CROP PLANTS 27, 116, 207, 218 
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instance in the diffusion of sorghum south of the Sahara and taro 
across the Pacific.19 More formal mechanisms for diffusing crop 
resources appear to have complemented informal methods since 
antiquity. The biogeography of rice was recognized in China at least 
2000 years ago,20 and expeditions that included the collection of new 
crops and crop varieties are reported for the Sumerians in 2500 BC.21  
Beginning in the fifteenth century, the colonial expansion and 
global migration of Europeans changed the scale and nature of crop 
diffusion in two ways. First, the amount and rapidity of diffusion 
were greatly augmented by the Iberian linkage between Europe, 
Africa, and the New World.22 This connection changed the 
agricultural landscape on all continents. Second, crop exploration and 
diffusion were formalized and eventually institutionalized.23 
Naturalists and plant explorers accompanied expeditions that had 
colonial or imperial intentions, and the collection and diffusion of 
medicinal, industrial, and food crops played a visible role in the 
European expansion between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.24 
Indeed, plant collection and exchange was seen as a normal part of 
diplomatic and economic intercourse among nations,25 an idea that 
was immortalized in Thomas Jefferson’s aphorism, “[t]he greatest 
service which can be rendered any country is, to add a useful plant to 
its culture”.26 
By the early twentieth century, plant collection, conservation and 
introduction had become a formalized government activity in the 
United States, Russia, and Australia.27 Responding to the discovery 
(1993); DANIEL ZOHARY & MARIA HOPF, DOMESTICATION OF PLANTS IN THE OLD WORLD 15, 
84, 172, 181 (2d ed. 1993). 
 19. SAUER, supra note 18, at 84; EVANS, supra note 15, at 73. 
 20. F. Bray, Agriculture, Vol. VI Pt. 2, in J. NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN 
CHINA 487 (1984). 
 21. C. LEONARD WOOLLEY, THE SUMERIANS 79 (1928). 
 22. CROSBY, supra note 16, at 73. 
 23. JOHN GASCOIGNE, SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE: JOSEPH BANKS, THE BRITISH 
STATE AND THE USES OF SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 130 (1998). 
 24. BROCKWAY, supra note 17. 
 25. Knowles A. Ryerson, History and Significance of the Foreign Plant Introduction 
Work of the United States Department of Agriculture, 7 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 110 (1933). 
 26. Services of Jefferson (1800), in IX THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 65 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
 27. Ryerson, supra note 25, at 121. 
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of the principles of inheritance in genetics,28 national crop breeding 
programs grew out of the foundations of informal plant exploration 
and introduction. The young science of genetics changed crop 
resources from a possible source of new production to a probable 
source. Vavilov was one of the first crop scientists to recognize and 
promote this idea.29 International programs for collection, 
conservation, evaluation, and use of genetic resources further 
changed the scope and nature of the movement of crop genetic 
resources among human communities and across great distances. 
Establishing effective crop breeding programs for international 
development followed the path blazed by Vavilov and others in 
assembling, evaluating, and utilizing large national collections of 
genetic resources from many places but principally from cradle areas 
of crop domestication.30  
II. THE COMMON HERITAGE REGIME 
“Common heritage” has historically been the implicit system for 
managing the diffusion of crop genetic resources, from the informal 
movement of crops in prehistoric times to the formal national and 
international framework of crop exploration and conservation 
agencies. Common heritage refers to the treatment of genetic 
resources as belonging to the public domain and not owned or 
otherwise monopolized by a single group or interest. Defining 
common heritage is similar to belated and sometimes last-ditch 
efforts to demarcate the public domain after the expansion of private 
property.31 Just as the public domain is most easily defined when its 
constituent parts are appropriated and privatized,32 common heritage 
 28. John M. Poehlman, How Crop Improvement Developed, in THE LITERATURE OF CROP 
SCIENCE 1, 9 (Wallace C. Olsen ed., 1995). 
 29. Vavilov, supra note 8, at 15. 
 30. DONALD L. PLUCKNETT ET AL., GENE BANKS AND THE WORLD’S FOOD 7–8 (1987); 
Ryerson, supra note 25, at 123 (discussing U.S. expeditions to Europe, Asia, and North Africa 
in the early twentieth century to bring myriad genetic resources from those countries to the 
United States). 
 31. See generally Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) 
(examining the public domain and copyright law). 
 32. See generally ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES (1998) (analyzing the constitutive role intellectual property plays in law and 
society). 
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is made visible when exchange and use of biological resources are 
restricted and privatized. An obstacle to understanding and 
appreciating common heritage is its inherently implicit nature, but 
roots of the concept are visible in the free exchange of seed among 
farmers, the long history of diffusion through informal and formal 
mechanisms, established scientific practices, and the application of 
the term to other resources in the international arena. Moreover, the 
robust debate about common property33 was likely to have triggered 
the use of the term by crop scientists. Reference to crop genetic 
resources as a common heritage appeared in the 1980s in association 
with the establishment of the Commission on Plant Genetic 
Resources at the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) and the launching of the International Undertaking of 
Plant Genetic Resources.34 The 1983 conference establishing the 
FAO Commission and International Undertaking affirmed a 
resolution stating that “plant genetic resources are a heritage of 
mankind and consequently should be available without restriction”.35  
Common heritage for plant resources implies open access to seeds 
and plants from farmers’ fields, with due recognition of prior 
informed consent and the importance of farmers’ need for seed and 
undisturbed fields. Common heritage reflects common property 
regimes described by anthropologists and other social scientists.36 
 33. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Duncan 
Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 
(1980). 
 34.  Resolution 8/83 of the Twenty-second Session of the FAO conference recognized that 
“plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind . . . .” Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) Res. 8/83, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture, U.N. FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(CGRFA), 22d Sess. [hereinafter Res. 8/83] pt. (a), at 1 (1983). Resolution 5/89 of the Twenty-
fifth Session of the FAO conference recognized that “plant genetic resources are a common 
heritage of mankind . . . .” FAO Res. 5/89, Farmers’ Rights, U.N. FAO, 25th Sess., pt. (a), at 1 
(1989); see also CARY FOWLER, UNNATURAL SELECTION 189 (1994); ROBIN PISTORIUS & 
JEROEN VAN WIJK, THE EXPLOITATION OF PLANT GENETIC INFORMATION 10–15 (1999). 
 35. Res. 8/83, supra note 34, Annex, at 2 (1983). 
 36. Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in THE 
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 1 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987); see also 
Fikret Berkes, Common-Property Resource Management and Cree Indian Fisheries in 
Subarctic Canada, in McCay & Acheson, supra; Arun Agrawal, Common Property Institutions 
and Sustainable Governance of Resources, 29 WORLD DEV. 1649 (2001) (examining common 
property-based resource management). 
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Like these common property regimes, common heritage implies open 
access; but whereas common property regimes often imply “club 
goods”37 that are openly accessible only to members, common 
heritage for genetic resources tends to involve fuzzy and permeable 
boundaries and lack of concern about access. This contrasts with the 
clear boundaries and control of access that are usual for more 
tangible and finite common property assets such as pastures, 
irrigation systems, and wood lots.38 The universal processes of 
diffusion and dispersal and the historical practice of reciprocity, 
which are all in the nature of crop genetic resources, provide the 
logical foundation for common heritage, but not for drawing sharp 
boundaries that define ownership. Crop genetic resources derive 
originally from the natural and amorphous processes of crop 
evolution: mutation, natural selection, exchange, and decentralized 
selection. Because no person or group controls crop evolution, it is 
inappropriate for anyone to claim authorship or ownership. Likewise, 
the tangled history of diffusion and dispersal not only obscures points 
of origin but suggests that all farmers benefit from fluid movement of 
seed. Farmers who openly provide seed expect to receive it in the 
same manner, and the same is true for crop breeders.  
Neither common heritage nor common property imply a lack of 
rules governing the use and management of common assets,39 a fact 
that has been often misunderstood.40 Rather, community management 
involves regulated access to common resources and reciprocity 
among users. One implicit principle in common heritage of genetic 
resources is the principle of reciprocity: those taking seeds are 
expected to provide similar access to crop resources. Open access is 
balanced by generalized reciprocity among farmers and plant 
breeders across economic sectors and national borders. Reciprocity 
by plant collectors and breeders becomes evident in three ways. First, 
 37. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 33 (2d ed. 1996). 
 38. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 90 (1990). 
 39. Stephen B. Brush, Is Common Heritage Outmoded?, in VALUING LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PPROPERTY RIGHTS 143 (Stephen B. 
Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996); see also OSTROM, supra note 38, at 92; CORNES & 
SANDLER, supra note 37. 
 40. McCay & Acheson, supra note 36, at 8; Hardin, supra note 33. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/5
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge 67 
 
 
 
plant collectors who gather material that is freely exchanged within 
farming communities continue this free exchange with crop breeders 
everywhere.41 Second, collectors and crop breeders have historically 
worked under the ethos of public sector research in which the free 
dissemination of improved crops and the availability of genetic 
resources from gene banks represents reciprocity to farmers and 
countries that provide genetic resources. The wide diffusion of 
modern crop varieties from international breeding programs is one 
indication of the extent of reciprocity under common heritage.42 
Third, plant variety protection, the most widely used form of 
Breeders’ Rights, includes farmers’ and researcher’s exemptions 
which allow farmers to replant and researchers to reuse certified seed 
without paying royalties to the certificate holder.43 Illustrating the 
reciprocity principle in practice, Shands and Stoner enumerate the 
multiple ways that the U.S. National Germplasm System honors its 
obligations in the global flow of crop resources. These include donor 
support to foreign and international conservation and crop 
improvement programs, cooperative breeding programs, access to 
USDA collections, repatriation of germplasm, training, and scientific 
exchange.44  
The exchange of seed among farmers and the lack of explicit 
proprietary rules governing specific crop types, traits, or germplasm 
appear to be common to agriculture before the twentieth century. It 
remains the dominant approach to seed management for the large 
majority of farmers around the world. The occasional prohibitions on 
the export of seed or plant cuttings, such as the nineteenth-century 
embargo by Peru and Bolivia on the export of Chinchona seedlings45 
 41. Henry L. Shands & Allan K. Stoner, Agricultural Germplasm and Global 
Contributions, in GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES 97, 97–98 (K. Elaine Hoagland & Amy Y. 
Rossman eds., 1997). 
 42.  Derek Byerlee, Modern Varieties, Productivity, and Sustainability, 24 WORLD DEV. 
697, 697 (1996). 
 43. David J. Houser, Exemptions Under Patents and Certificates Covering Plants and 
Comments on Material Transfer Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
PROTECTION OF PLANT MATERIALS 107, 108 (P. Stephen Baenziger et al. eds., 1993). 
 44. Shands & Stoner, supra note 41, at 101. 
 45. BROCKWAY, supra note 17, at 115–16; TOBY MUSGRAVE & WILL MUSGRAVE, AN 
EMPIRE OF PLANTS 154 (2000). 
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or Ethiopia’s more recent embargo on coffee,46 cannot be interpreted 
as negating the custom of treating genetic resources as public goods. 
The age-old and continuing diffusion of crops through informal and 
formal mechanisms, without restrictions on the use of progeny, also 
supports the argument that genetic resources historically have been 
defined as part of the public domain.  
The crop scientists who articulated the idea of common heritage 
for crop resources were acculturated in science as a social system 
without proprietary relations over its basic resources: theories, 
algorithms, or methodologies.47 The sociology of science in this 
context was described by Merton as the Communism of science in 
which concern for authorship did not imply exclusive rights.48 
Accordingly, most crop scientists who helped establish the 
international framework for plant genetic resources worked in public 
breeding programs that released their products as public goods.  
Crop scientists also adopted the concept of common heritage from 
the international discourse about caring for the global environment.49 
The search for ways to confront degradation in extra-territorial 
regions such as the open seas led to the concept of common heritage50 
and to international legal frameworks such as the Antarctic Treaty 
(1959) and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). Five 
elements of common heritage emerged from these negotiations:51 
1. Areas defined as common heritage would not be subject to 
appropriation by private or public interests; 
2. All people would share in the management of common 
territory; 
 46. CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF 
GENETIC DIVERSITY (1990). 
 47. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 293 (Norman W. Storer ed., 
1973). 
 48. Id. at 274. 
 49. Francis X. Cunningham, The Common Heritage, FOREIGN SERV. J., July/Aug. 1981, 
at 13. 
 50. Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986). 
 51. Id. 
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3. Economic benefits from the exploitation of common 
territory would be shared internationally; 
4. Common territory would only be used for peaceful 
purposes; and 
5. Scientific research in common territory would be freely and 
openly accessible. 
These principles were never explicitly applied to crop genetic 
resources, perhaps because of ambiguity about the exact definition of 
these resources. If resources are defined as wild relatives of crops or 
cultivated populations of farmers’ varieties (landraces) that cannot be 
attributed to one farmer or specific point of origin, then these 
common heritage principles are appropriate. If resources are defined 
as all genetic material of crops, then the first three of these principles 
are violated by the plant patenting and plant variety protections 
(Breeders’ Rights) that were in place in industrial countries before 
1980. Some used common heritage to argue against the right of 
breeders to protect their products,52 while others saw common 
heritage and Breeders’ Rights as co-existing.53 The central vagueness 
in defining common agricultural heritage is whether it applies to all 
genetic material or just to material that is in nature and unclaimed as 
property. This ambiguity has had devastating consequences for the 
continued practice of relatively easy and open access to genetic 
resources.  
Common heritage management of genetic material that is not 
claimed as intellectual property remains conspicuous at two 
extremes: in farming communities of Vavilov Centers and in the flow 
of germplasm through international gene banks. The exchange of 
crop material among farmers within and between communities 
appears to be ubiquitous and perhaps a necessary part of agriculture.54 
Seed exchange is necessitated and promoted by many factors. Seeds 
have finite viability because of the constantly changing natural 
 52. P.R. MOONEY, THE LAW OF THE SEED 45 (1983). 
 53. C. Mastenbroek, Plant Breeders’ Rights, An Equitable Legal System for New Plant 
Cultivars, 24 EXPERIMENTAL AGRIC. 15, 22–24 (1988). 
 54. Stephen B. Brush, Bioprospecting the Public Domain, 14 CULTURAL ANTHRO. 535 
(1999). 
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environment, especially pests and pathogens. Seed becomes infested 
with disease organisms, such as viruses. Human tastes are notoriously 
fickle, especially when reflected in markets. Households lose seed in 
bad years or to rot and vermin. These factors and many others lead to 
common folk admonitions to change seed often,55 while other forces 
result in a constant commingling of individual farmers’ material.56 
Commingling of genetic material within and among villages occurs 
on common threshing floors, in the exchange of gifts of seed, wage 
payment in kind to agricultural labor, and in regional trade of 
commodities and seed.57 This commingling poses a high barrier to 
any other form of seed management than common heritage.  
Case studies of rice turnover in Thailand58 and maize seed flow in 
Mexico59 illustrate the significance of farmer-to-farmer seed 
exchange. Dennis found that Thai rice farmers relied mostly on 
traditional varieties and grew an average of 1.7 varieties per farm, but 
variety turnover was high.60 Variety lists from 1950 to 1961 indicate 
eighty-nine types of rice in the study region, and in 1982–83, only 
fifteen of these were still present among the total of 122 varieties. 
Dennis found that average projected turnover time for upland rice 
was thirty to forty-eight years, while the time for lowland, irrigated 
rice was thirteen years.61 Traditional and local varieties were subject 
to turnover as well as modern varieties. In sum, variety turnover is a 
regular part of traditional Thai rice agriculture, and traditional 
varieties are not necessarily local varieties.  
 55. A.C. Zeven, The Traditional Inexplicable Replacement of Seed and Seed Ware of 
Landraces and Cultivars, 110 EUPHYTICA 181, 181–82 (1999). 
 56. Stephen Brush et al., Potato Diversity in the Andean Center of Crop Domestication, 9 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1189 (1995) (examining diversity and population structure of potato 
landraces to better conserve genetic resources). 
 57. Stephen B. Brush et al., Dynamics of Andean Potato Agriculture, 35 ECON. BOTANY 
10 (1981); Hugo Perales R. et al., Dynamic Management of Maize Landraces in Central 
Mexico, 57 ECON. BOTANY 21 (2003). 
 58. John Value Dennis, Farmer Management of Rice Variety Diversity in Northern 
Thailand 123 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file at University 
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI). 
 59. D. Louette, Traditional Management of Seed and Genetic Diversity: What is a 
Landrace?, in GENES IN THE FIELD 109 (Stephen Brush ed., 1999). 
 60. Dennis, supra note 58, at 194. 
 61. Id. at 124. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/5
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge 71 
 
 
 
Similarly in Mexico, a Vavilov Center like Thailand, the flow of 
maize germplasm also appears significant among farming 
communities. Louette found that farmers in Cuzalapa, Jalisco 
regularly change the seed lots of their maize landraces and acquire 
seed of existing varieties and new varieties from outside their 
community.62 She found that fifteen percent of the seed lots in the 
study period were from outside. Perales found a similar pattern in the 
Chalco and Cuautla Valleys of central Mexico, where farmers 
frequently purchase seed in urban market places and where seed of 
maize landraces moves between different states.63 Both Louette and 
Perales describe the genetic base of maize landraces as an open 
system. This description has likewise been applied to potato 
landraces found in Quechua farmers’ fields in the Cusco area.64 With 
better information about farmer seed management in traditional 
farming systems, we now think of landraces as metapopulations or 
networks of individual populations that are linked through seed flow 
among farmers and communities.  
Moving from farmers’ fields in Vavilov Centers to the flow of 
crop germplasm through international gene banks and crop breeding 
programs, we also see an open system. Duvick argued that a 
distinguishing characteristic between traditional and modern farming 
systems was the locus of diversity in each.65 According to this view, 
diversity in traditional farming systems was found on individual 
farms and in farming communities, while in modern systems 
diversity was shifted to a network of gene banks and breeding 
programs. We have modified our thinking about traditional farming 
to recognize the importance of metapopulations and seed systems, but 
we can accept Duvick’s description of modern agriculture as an 
interdependent network of seed and germplasm sources.66 Very few 
 62. Louette, supra note 59. 
 63. Hugo Rafael Perales Rivera, Conservation and Evolution of Maize in Amecameca and 
Cuatla Valleys of Mexico 230 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California 
Davis) (on file at University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI). 
 64. Karl S. Zimmerer, The Ecogeography of Andean Potatoes, 48 BIOSCIENCE 445, 452 
(1998). 
 65. Donald N. Duvick, Genetic Diversity in Major Farm Crops on the Farm and in 
Reserve, 38 ECON. BOTANY 161 (1984). 
 66. Id. 
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countries or farming systems in the world today do not rely to some 
degree on the international system that moves crop germplasm, 
breeding lines, improved varieties, and commercial seed across 
international borders. Studies of breeding programs show that 
developing countries, including those within Vavilov Centers, are 
heavily dependent on international flows of germplasm and more 
dependent than developed countries.67 Rejesus et al. examined wheat 
breeding and found that in West Asia, the Vavilov Center for wheat, 
wheat breeders’ use of their own landraces and advanced lines 
accounted for 34.2% of the breeding material in their programs 
compared to 37.9% from international sources.68 For rice, Evenson 
and Gollin document the flow of germplasm in Asia and the 
dependence of Asian countries on germplasm obtained from the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).69 Vavilov Center 
countries (e.g., India, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam) depended 
on IRRI for between 65.0% (India) and 98.1% (Vietnam) for the rice 
material in their breeding programs. This compared to 13.6% in U.S. 
rice breeding. Fowler et al. estimate that 89.8% of the rice samples 
distributed from IRRI go to developing countries.70 The international 
exchange of crop germplasm is similar to exchange among farmers in 
being an open system.71  
Both farmer seed exchange and international crop germplasm 
flows evolved originally as common heritage regimes. Common 
heritage is logical within farming communities where land and other 
natural resources are communally owned, seed is exchanged or 
shared, invention is collective, provenance is ambiguous, and natural 
and artificial selection are intertwined. Because of the transaction 
costs of proprietary management of seed, common heritage arguably 
is the best way to satisfy the frequent necessity to change or acquire 
seed in non-market economies. Privatization of land and the 
development of a market for labor do not necessitate the privatization 
 67. SMALE ET AL., supra note 13.  
 68. R.M. Rejesus et al., Wheat Breeders’ Perspectives on Genetic Diversity and 
Germplasm Use, 9 PLANT VARIETIES & SEEDS 129, 132 (1996). The origin of the remainder of 
parent material in wheat breeders’ crossing blocks was not clearly identified. Id. 
 69. Evenson & Gollin, supra note 13, at 481.  
 70. Fowler et al., supra note 13, at 192. 
 71. Id. at 190. 
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of genetic resources. Intellectual property for plants was a rather 
recent change72 that lagged far behind the development of markets for 
land and labor. Plant patenting and other forms of intellectual 
property in plants has been willingly embraced in some countries but 
resisted in many others.73 
Likewise, a common heritage approach for international exchange 
is sensible because it lowers transaction costs that are inherent in 
defining and defending property over genetic resources.74 These costs 
include negotiation, pre-distribution tracking, and post-distribution 
tracking75 as well as the conventional transaction costs (e.g., 
exclusion, information, and communication), identified by 
economists.76 An example of information costs associated with crop 
genetic resources is how to ascertain the true “source” of collections. 
Germplasm collecting existed for many decades before it was more 
formally organized in the 1970s with the creation of world collections 
and the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources to facilitate 
collection and exchange. The United States received germplasm from 
many sources, including missionaries, diplomats, and plant explorers. 
The original collections that established the U.S. national gene bank 
(National Seed Storage Laboratory) included material that had only 
the country of origin.77 These U.S. collections were duplicated and 
distributed to other national and international gene banks, such as the 
Italian National Gene Bank at Bari and the International Center for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), thus multiplying 
the material without detailed provenience in gene banks around the 
world.78 A 1984 review of the status and use of gene banks by Peeters 
and Williams reports that passport data was wholly lacking for sixty-
 72. FOWLER, supra note 34, at 73. 
 73. Martin Khor, Third World, 37 RACE & CLASS 73, 74 (1996). 
 74. BERT VISSER ET AL., GLOBAL FORUM ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH (GFAR), DOC. 
NO. GFAR/00/17-04-04, TRANSACTION COSTS OF GERMPLASM EXCHANGE UNDER BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 2–3 (2000), available at http://www.egfar.org/documents/02_-_meetings/ 
conferences/gfar_2000/session_2/gf170404.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 3. 
 76. Ronald H. Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LAW 157–86 (1988). 
 77. Conversation with Ardeshir B. Damania, Genetic Resources Conservation Program, 
University of California, Davis (Jan. 15, 2003). 
 78. Id. 
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five percent of the samples in the active international network of gene 
banks.79 This percentage has probably decreased as more systematic 
collection has added to inventories, but the FAO reports that only 
thirty-seven percent of the material in national collections has 
passport data.80  
Plant explorers often cover large territories and reduce collection 
times by collecting in markets and other central places such as 
schools. Even if collections come directly from farmers, the seed may 
be a recent acquisition from another farmer or village. Assigning a 
territorial designation may also be problematic because of the 
frequency of migration and the transitory nature of political 
boundaries. Assuring that source information adheres to collections 
also incurs cost. Imposing transaction costs associated with 
privatization onto the international exchange crop germplasm is 
defensible if the benefits of privatization, such as improved access 
and conservation are realized, but whether these benefits will indeed 
result is yet to be demonstrated.  
In contemporary parlance, common heritage means that genetic 
resources are an international public good81 used by crop scientists to 
produce other public goods. Common heritage is a rational system of 
managing crop genetic resources in the international system that was 
principally organized as a way to facilitate public breeding programs. 
The public good nature of this system is embodied in the practice of 
open exchange of crop germplasm among crop breeders and in the 
research exemption of plant variety protection systems.82 The period 
of common heritage management provided an international benefit of 
immeasurable proportions. The availability of crop resources outside 
of their original hearths provided food sources that altered human 
 79. J.P. Peeters & J.T. Williams, Towards Better Use of Genebanks with Special 
Reference to Information, 60 PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES NEWSL. 22, 24 (1984). 
 80. UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE (1997) [hereinafter 
STATE OF THE WORLD], available at http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/agricult/agp/agps/ 
pgrfa/pdf/swrfull.pdf. 
 81. RAVI KANBUR ET AL., THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: COMMON POOLS 
AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS (1999); Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, 
in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 2, 13 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999). 
 82. Houser, supra note 43, at 108. 
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history. The “Columbian Exchange”83 not only benefited Europeans 
but it also made new staples, such as maize, beans, sweet potatoes, 
and potatoes, available to Africa and Asia. More recently, the 
collection of genetic resources under common heritage led directly to 
increasing food availability around the world through breeding high 
yielding varieties whose pedigrees include germplasm from 
numerous countries.84  
III. CLOSING THE GENETIC COMMONS 
Following the successful initiatives of the 1970s to organize an 
international framework for conserving crop genetic resources, the 
common heritage approach for managing access came under 
increasing, erosive pressure. Factors that combined to threaten the 
common heritage approach include the increasing value of genetic 
resources, the expansion of Breeders’ Rights in industrial countries, 
the liberal policy formulation for agricultural development, the 
North/South political discourse, and the rise of the environmental 
movement. These strands converged in the early 1990s to produce the 
CBD, and when taken together with the Global Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs, they point to the demise of common heritage. By the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, however, common heritage had 
regained status as the underlying principle of a new international 
framework for managing access to crop genetic resources. 
Genetic resources gained value throughout the twentieth century 
by virtue of increasing demand and decreasing supply. The discovery 
of the principles of inheritance provided impetus for the creation of 
systematic crop breeding, an endeavor that required a supply of 
genetic material.85 Public and private crop breeding expanded its role 
throughout the twentieth century, first in the rapidly industrializing 
countries of Europe and North America,86 and then internationally 
 83. CROSBY, supra note 16, at 185–88 (describing the importance of New World crops to 
Africa). 
 84. Byerlee, supra note 42, at 697; Melinda Smale, The Green Revolution and Wheat 
Genetic Diversity: Some Unfounded Assumptions, 25 WORLD DEV. 1257, 1257 (1997). 
 85. Ryerson, supra note 25, at 123–24.  
 86. DEBORAH FITZGERALD, THE BUSINESS OF BREEDING: HYBRID CORN IN ILLINOIS, 
1890–1940 (1990). Fitzgerald chronicles the rise of private corn breeding on the foundations of 
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into the developing countries.87 While organized crop breeding 
increased the demand for genetic resources, genetic erosion that 
accompanied agricultural modernization threatened the supply of 
those resources.88 The creation of an international network of over 
1300 national and regional germplasm collections in addition to 
eleven international gene banks managed by CGIAR institutions, and 
with six million accessions is evidence of increased value of genetic 
resources.89  
The rise of crop breeding also contributed to the demise of 
common heritage by changing perceptions about crop breeders and 
ownership of living matter. After 1900, crop breeders emerged as 
another type of inventor who manipulated common goods into novel 
and more useful ones,90 so it is not surprising that intellectual 
property protection for plant breeders soon followed the rise of 
systematic crop improvement. A progression of different forms of 
Breeders’ Rights ensued, the U.S. Plant Patent Act in 1930, and since 
this Act, Breeders’ Rights have been expanded both in terms of what 
products are eligible for protection as intellectual property and in the 
strength of protection afforded to breeders. Utility patents on new 
crops, their component parts, and processes have thus been added to 
plant patents and plant variety certificates.91 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the legitimacy of utility patents for crops in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International.92 Moreover, less developed 
countries have increasingly adopted Breeders’ Rights to stimulate 
crop improvement and in response to international pressure. Perhaps 
most importantly, Breeders’ Rights are included in the Trade-Related 
public science. See, e.g., DEBORAH FITZGERALD, The Uses of Science: History of the Funk 
Brothers Seed Company, in FITZGERALD, THE BUSINESS OF BREEDING, supra; JACK RALPH 
KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 
1492–2000, at 105–16 (1988); HENRY A. WALLACE & WILLIAM L. BROWN, CORN AND ITS 
EARLY FATHERS, (Iowa State University Press rev. ed. 1988). 
 87. LLOYD T. EVANS, FEEDING THE TEN BILLION 133 (1998). 
 88. O.H. Frankel, Genetic Conservation in Perspective, in GENETIC RESOURCES IN 
PLANTS—THEIR EXPLORATION AND CONSERVATION 469, 474 (O. H. Frankel & E. Bennett 
eds., 1970); Jack R. Harlan, Our Vanishing Genetic Resources, 188 SCIENCE 618, 619 (1975).  
 89. STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 80, at 98, 107. 
 90. FOWLER, supra note 34, at 89. 
 91. Nicholas J. Seay, Intellectual Property Rights in Plants, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 61, 66. 
 92. 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001). 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement93 and are 
part of the package of national policies required for membership in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).94 While the TRIPS agreement 
allows countries to fashion their own (sui generis) approach to 
Breeders’ Rights,95 the need to conform to international standards 
encourages adoption of a system resembling the International Union 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) approach.  
The development of plant breeding, the expansion of Breeders’ 
Rights, and the recognition of genetic erosion as a social cost of 
agricultural development seemed to portend the inevitable demise of 
common heritage. The apparent failure of the common heritage 
system to contain the degradation of crop genetic resources conforms 
to the Tragedy of the Commons scenario.96 This failure is attributed 
to the open access quality of the common heritage system that 
allowed breeders to benefit from using resources without bearing the 
cost of maintaining them. Hardin97 and others98 argued that 
privatizing common pool resource was the way to arrive at socially 
acceptable levels of use and conservation, and this argument was 
easily extended to genetic resources.99  
The North/South political discourse took up the availability of 
Breeders’ Rights in industrialized countries and their absence 
elsewhere as evidence of an imbalance in the stream of benefits 
flowing from genetic resources.100 Breeders were accorded the right 
 93. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 
78 (2000); MARTIN A. GIRSBERGER, BIODIVERSITY AND THE CONCEPT OF FARMERS’ RIGHTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Thomas Cottier ed., 1999); Dan Leskien & Michael Flitner, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis System, 
ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 6 (International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), 
June 1997, at 2. 
 94. Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, Reforming Intellectual Property Rights 
Regimes, 1 J. ECON. INT’L L. 537, 539 n.3 (1998). 
 95. Leskien & Flitner, supra note 93, at 48. 
 96. Hardin, supra note 33, at 1243.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967). 
 99. Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources, in 
SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY 293 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). 
 100. Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy: National 
Property Versus Common Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 99, at 173, 173–
74. 
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to tangible, private benefits while farmers had to rely on indirect, 
public benefits. The reciprocity of the common heritage system 
functioned through providing public goods such as new crop 
varieties, education, and development infrastructure rather than in 
private goods that directly connected the farmer and crop breeder. 
The critical ambiguity of whether common heritage should apply to 
all genetic resources or only to those in fields and farm stores became 
a political liability. The relatively low visibility of the reciprocity 
provided a basis for claims of exploitation under the label 
“biopiracy.”101 Odek’s definition of biopiracy as the “uni-directional 
and uncompensated appropriation” of genetic resources102 pointedly 
ignored the reciprocity of the international system of collecting, 
conserving, using, and redistributing crop genetic resources. More 
generally, this reciprocity was undervalued by arguments that 
contractual collection arrangements are needed to ensure equitable 
returns.103 Finally, the rise of the “neo-liberal” policy agenda in 
international development after 1980104 and the increasing pressure 
for more participatory and non-governmental programs105 favored 
market solutions to development problems such as conserving crop 
resources.  
By 1992, these strands had converged to create conditions for a 
bold move against common heritage, and a potential coup de grâce 
was delivered in the 1992 CBD that defined genetic resources as 
belonging to nation states. The initialing of the CBD at the 1992 U.N. 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro marks a watershed in the management of crop genetic 
resources.106 UNCED sought to forge a new framework for 
 101. VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 5 (1997). 
 102. James O. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 
2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 145 (1994). 
 103. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (WRI), WORLD CONSERVATION UNION (IUCN), 
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY: 
GUIDELINES FOR ACTION TO SAVE, STUDY, AND USE EARTH’S BIOTIC WEALTH SUSTAINABLY 
AND EQUITABLY 94 (1992). 
 104. John Williamson, The Washington Consensus Revisited, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT INTO THE XXI CENTURY 48 (Louis Emmerji ed., 1997). 
 105. R. CHAMBERS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PUTTING THE LAST FIRST 168 (1983). 
 106. Lyle Glowka et al., Int’l Union for the Conservation of Nature, A Guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ENVTL. POLICY AND LAW PAPER NO. 30, 1994, at 1. 
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confronting environmental problems.107 This new framework 
intended to defuse increasing North/South polarization of the pre-
UNCED era with a cooperative approach involving unbinding (“soft 
law”) agreements such as Agenda 21, community based forms of 
action, inclusion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
voluntary reporting.108 UNCED also followed a period of heightened 
awareness of the trans-national nature of environmental problems and 
somewhat fitful attempts to negotiate individual, legally binding 
conventions, such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.109  
The post-UNCED system for managing crop genetic resources 
was characterized by national ownership of crop resources overlying 
professional practices inherited from the pre-UNCED (common 
heritage) period and the creation of management tools that would be 
appropriate to the UNCED principles of sovereign ownership and 
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of biological resources. 
Two contradictory pressures, however, are evident in the spirit of 
UNCED. The emphasis on sovereign ownership suggested a move to 
regulate access to national resources through bilateral contracting 
mechanisms that became know as bioprospecting agreements.110 The 
second pressure in UNCED was to eschew legally binding 
international conventions111 in favor of a more cooperative “soft law” 
approach112 based on voluntary mechanisms. 
These pressures have had different effects in reshaping access to 
genetic resources depending whether pharmaceutical and natural 
product resources or crop resources are involved. Access to resources 
 107. Jacqueline Roddick, Earth Summit North and South, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 147, 
147 (1997). 
 108. DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 120 
(1996); see also Roddick, supra note 107. 
 109. See generally U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF 
THE SEA (1997) (reproducing the text of the agreement with index and excerpts from the Final 
Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea). 
 110. Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING 
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993); 
Sarah A. Laird & Kerry ten Kate, Biodiversity Prospecting: The Commercial Use of Genetic 
Resources and Best Practice in Benefit-Sharing, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE 241, 243 (Sarah A. Laird ed., 2002). 
 111. Roddick, supra note 107, at 156. 
 112. Francesco Mauro & Preston D. Hardison, Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous and 
Local Communities, 10 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1263, 1266 (2000). 
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for pharmaceutical development tended toward regulation by bilateral 
contracts while access to resources for crop development has tended 
toward open, multilateral mechanisms.113 Three differences between 
these two genetic resources explain this outcome. First, 
pharmaceutical resources tend to involve relatively discrete traits and 
perhaps single genes while crop resources involve quantitative traits 
that are controlled by multiple genes. Second, crop resources are 
dependent on human stewardship and have resulted from collective 
management and selection. Third, pharmaceutical resources lacked 
the international infrastructure of collection, conservation, public 
breeding, and exchange that was developed for crop resources.114 The 
Merck/InBio contract115 epitomized bioprospecting contracts for 
pharmaceutical and natural product development. Comparable 
agreements between suppliers and users of crop genetic resources are 
rare, but in their place, suppliers of crop resources have promoted the 
use of material transfer agreements.116 These mechanisms are 
sometimes informational rather than financial contracts. For instance, 
the instruments developed by the international gene banks of the 
CGIAR system inform the recipient of germplasm that it is for 
research and breeding purposes only and inveigh him/her to forgo 
future claims of intellectual property.117 These mechanisms retain 
 113. Brendan Tobin, Biodiversity Prospecting Contracts, in BIODIVERSITY AND 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 110, at 287; COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (CIPR), INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 69 (2002), at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ 
ciprfullfinal.pdf. 
 114. Perhaps because of the extremely large number of species kept at botanical collections 
and herbariums, their policy is to make specimens available to researchers. See, e.g., Royal 
Botanic Gardens, Kew: Collections: Herbarium (last visited Dec. 26, 2004), at 
http://www.rbgkew.org.uk/collections/herbcol.html. No comparable system exists for plant 
resources for pharmaceuticals to the one for crop resources, which involves the exchange of 
seed as well as information about the accessions. See BIODIVERSITY IN TRUST: CONSERVATION 
AND USE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN CGIAR CENTRES (Dominic Fuccillo et al. eds., 
1997); PLUCKNETT ET AL., supra note 30. 
 115. Reid et al., supra note 110, at 2. 
 116. John H. Barton & Wolfgang E. Siebeck, Material Transfer Agreements in Genetic 
Resources Exchange—The Case of the International Agricultural Research Centres, ISSUES IN 
GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 1, May 1994, at 11; see also Michael A. Gollin, Elements of 
Commercial Biodiversity Prospecting Agreements, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 110, at 310, 313. 
 117. See, e.g., CENTRO INTERNACIONAL DE AGRICULTURA TROPICAL (CIAT), MATERIAL 
TRANSFER AGREEMENT (2001), available at http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/pgr/mta.htm.
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common heritage aspects of the pre-UNCED era and avoid moving to 
more rigid contractual agreements that specify benefit flows that are 
found in bioprospecting agreements for pharmaceutical and other 
natural products.118 In other cases, however, countries have turned to 
the Mutual Transfer Agreement (MTA) as a contractual mechanism 
to transfer genetic resources. An example of this is the use of MTAs 
by the National Biodiversity Institute of Costa Rica that accompany 
the transfer samples to partner organizations and have contractual 
power recognized by national law.119 
Civil society organizations, nations, regional coalitions, and 
international agencies have responded to the closure of the biological 
commons with a variety of programs and implements aimed at 
protecting the public domain. On program is to register traditional 
knowledge practices and innovations and thereby define them as a 
prior art so that they cannot be directly appropriated as intellectual 
property. The American Association for the Advancement of Science 
has initiated the Traditional Ecological Knowledge * Prior Art 
Database where plant names and associated knowledge can be 
registered.120 At the international level, the negotiation of the 
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture represents the culmination of an enduring effort to 
maintain crop resources as common pool goods.  
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
Besides material transfer agreements, the international crop 
resource system responded to national sovereignty with negotiations 
that eventually reconfirmed the principles of relatively unfettered and 
uncompensated germplasm exchange. Negotiations involving the 
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 
 118. Reid et al., supra note 110. 
 119. Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, Costa Rica: Legal Framework and Public Policy, in 
SANTIAGO CARRIZOSA ET AL., ACCESSING  BIODIVERSITY AND SHARING THE BENEFITS 101 
(2004). 
 120. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (AAAS), AAAS 
PROJECT ON TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE, at http://shr.aaas.org/tek (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2004). 
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the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, and numerous nations resulted in two international 
agreements that confirmed common heritage. In 1994, the collections 
of the international gene banks of the CGIAR centers were placed 
under the auspices of the FAO, to be managed as an international 
public good by the gene banks, excepted from intellectual property 
claims, and freely available to crop breeders.121 Second, the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) was negotiated in 2001122 and has now been 
signed by seventy-eight countries, including the U.S.123 Having 
reached the required number of national instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, the treaty went into force on June 
29, 2004.124 
The ITPGRFA takes a multilateral approach that reaffirms 
common heritage for the crop genera that are included in list of crops 
covered by the pact. States retain sovereign rights over their genetic 
resources, including the right to designate genetic material and whole 
plants as intellectual property. The core provisions of the ITPGRFA 
(Articles 10–12) place the resources of thirty-six genera of crops and 
twenty-nine genera of forages in the public domain and guarantees 
access to these resources for breeding and research. Germplasm from 
the multilateral system will be available with an MTA that may 
include provisions for benefit sharing in the event of 
commercialization. The Treaty stipulates that 
Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other 
rights that limit the facilitated access to plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, 
in the form received from the Multilateral System.125 
 121. PISTORIUS & VAN WIJK, supra note 34; CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH (CGIAR) SYSTEM-WIDE GENETIC RESOURCES PROGRAMME, 1999 
ACTIVITIES (2000), at http://sgrp.cgiar.org/1999activities-policy.html. 
 122. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources of Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, U.N. Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) (2001), at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/itpgre.pdf. 
 123. ITPGRFA, U.N. FAO Legal Office (last visited Dec. 26, 2004), at 
http://www.fao.org/legal/treaties/033s-e.htm. 
 124. Id. 
 125. ITPGRFA, supra note 122, art. 12.3.d. 
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The phrase “in the form received” may be interpreted as allowing 
intellectual property claims once significant, inventive manipulation 
has occurred.126 The interpretation of this issue and others will be 
negotiated by parties to the treaty that will comprise the Governing 
Body of the International Undertaking. The FAO serves as the 
proprietor of the international crop collections that are held in trust by 
the CGIAR, and the CGIAR system has repeatedly confirmed its 
adherence to open access to these collections.127  
Article 13 of the ITPGRFA lays out a procedure for benefit 
sharing by stipulating that commercialization of a new plant variety 
will trigger a financial contribution to the multilateral system. Again, 
the approach is multilateral rather than contractual between the 
genetic resource provider and the person who commercialized a 
product using that resource. The level, form, and conditions of 
payment (for instance, whether small farmers are exempt) is not 
resolved in the treaty and will be subject to further negotiations 
within the Governing Body of the International Undertaking.128 The 
benefit-sharing mechanism of the ITPGRFA faces serious logistical 
difficulty because of the long lag time between access to genetic 
resources and commercialization. Moreover, identifying the 
contribution of a specific resource within the complex pedigree of an 
improved crop variety poses a major obstacle to negotiating benefit 
sharing. Nevertheless, the treaty provides a mechanism for 
negotiating these obstacles while access to crop resources remains 
open. Another obstacle is the increasing propensity of 
commercialization of crop varieties based on patents of transgenic 
components such as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) and tolerance to 
glyphosate herbicides.129 Because these traits do not derive from 
 126. CIPR, supra note 113, at 69. 
 127. Susan Bragdon & David Downes, Recent Policy Trends and Developments Related to 
the Conservation, Use and Development of Genetic Resources, ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES 
NO. 7 (IPGRI), June 1998, at 17, available at http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/policy/igr7.pdf. 
 128. The terms of benefit sharing are to be determined by the Governing Body of the 
treaty, comprised of all contracting parties. See ITPGRFA, supra note 122, art. 13.2.d.ii. 
 129. See, e.g., Greg Graff et al., Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing Countries, in 
PERSPECTIVES IN WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2004, at 417, 423–24 (Colin G. Scanes & 
John A. Miranowski eds., 2004); Janice A. Kimpel, Freedom to Operate, 37 ANN. REV. OF 
PHYTOPATHOLOGY 29, 38 (1999). Moreover, besides reliance on intellectual property in 
agricultural biotechnology, there is evidence of increasing concentration in this research sector. 
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traditional agricultural knowledge, commercialization of crops based 
on these traits may not contribute to the multilateral system 
developed by the ITPGRFA.130  
This treaty grew out of nearly two decades of negotiation at the 
FAO concerning an international system for managing crop genetic 
resources.131 Following UNCED, the system of international 
germplasm exchange faced the rise of bilateral agreements which the 
CBD sovereignty clause invited, but four factors pushed treaty 
negotiation toward a multilateral framework. First, replacing the open 
system with one defined by bilateral contracts would entail steep 
transaction costs that might exceed the value of the resources.132 
Second, the process of creating a new access regime based on 
bilateral contracts posed the threat of interrupting germplasm 
exchange because of an anti-commons133 resulting from the claims of 
different parties to control over access.134 Third, increasing evidence 
suggested heavy dependence by poor countries on outside germplasm 
resources,135 contradicting the conclusion that industrial countries 
were more dependent on germplasm from developing countries.136 
Fourth, accessions from large and valuable collections of the CGIAR 
network and industrial countries, such as the National Seed Storage 
James F. Oehmke & Christopher A. Wolf, Measuring Concentration in the Biotechnology R&D 
Industry, 6 AGBIOFORUM 134, 135 (2003). 
 130. Article 11.2 of the ITPGRFA specifies that “[t]he Multilateral System . . . shall 
include all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I that are under the 
management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain.” ITPGRFA, supra 
note 122, art. 11.2. Agbiotech components, such as the Bt and herbicide tolerance traits, are 
transgenes that are inserted into crop plants outside the context of national and privately owned 
gene banks. See Gerald C. Nelson, Traits and Techniques of GMOs, in GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN AGRICULTURE 7 (Gerald C. Nelson ed., 2001). 
 131. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 187. 
 132. VISSER ET AL., supra note 74. 
 133. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998) (introducing the 
anticommons as a tool in property theory and showing how awareness of anticommons can 
shape legal policymaking); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
 134. See POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 108, at 128; CARLOS M. CORREA, OPTIONS FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FARMERS’ RIGHTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (Instituto Agronomico 
per l’Oltremare (IAO), Working Paper No. 8, Dec. 2000). 
 135. Evenson & Gollin, supra note 13; Fowler et al., supra note 13. 
 136. Jack Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, The Plant Germplasm Controversy, 37 
BIOSCIENCE 190, 190 (1987). 
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Laboratory of the U.S., remained openly available to crop breeders.137 
As long as these germplasm collections were managed as common 
heritage resources, bilateral contracts for the same type of resources 
were untenable.  
Uncertainty over whether a new international order for crop 
genetic resources reconfirmed or undermined common heritage as 
plant breeders understood had bogged down negotiations about the 
International Undertaking at the FAO.138 The ITPGRFA finally 
overcame the conflict by shifting emphasis toward open-access to 
crop resources and away from the issue of compensation. Avoiding 
the long-term disputes about patenting life forms and gene sequences 
also aided the agreement on the status of international collections. 
Finally, by separating the issue of gene bank access from Farmers’ 
Rights and accepting the co-existence of Breeders’ Rights and 
common-pool rights, the ITPGRFA gained acceptance from over 100 
countries and avoided any specific national opposition.139  
V. FARMERS’ RIGHTS  
The FAO Commission’s International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources provided a forum for negotiating three different 
international goals: (1) conserving crop germplasm, (2) ensuring its 
exploration and availability, and (3) addressing equity interests of 
farmers in developing nations.140 A primary strategy for meeting the 
last goal was the movement to create a program of Farmers’ Rights. 
These were conceived as a way to address the imbalance between 
genetic and economic wealth found in industrial and developing 
countries;141 but at their inception, Farmers’ Rights were also linked 
 137. The history of germplasm distribution from CGIAR center gene banks is documented 
in Fowler et al., supra note 13. The U.S. policy is described in Shands & Stoner, supra note 41. 
See also Allan K. Stoner, Celebrating a Century of Plant Exploration, 46 AGRIC. RES. MAG. 2 
(1998). 
 138. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 197. 
 139. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Sixth Extraordinary Session of the Commission on 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, June 25–30, 2001, at http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/ 
excgrfa-6. 
 140. See Bragdon & Downes, supra note 127, at 13. 
 141. FOWLER, supra note 34, at 201; see also José Esquinas-Alcázar, Farmers’ Rights, in 
AGRICULTURAL VALUES OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 207, 209 (Robert E. Evenson et al. 
eds., 1998). 
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to an agenda to curtail Breeders’ Rights. FAO Commission 
Resolution 8/83, which established the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources in 1983, had stressed the common heritage 
principle that plant genetic resources should be available without 
restriction. It provides a sweeping definition of genetic resources as 
incorporating not only wild and weedy crop relatives and farmers’ 
varieties, but also newly developed “varieties” and “special genetic 
stocks (including elite and current breeders’ lines and mutants).”142 In 
classifying all types of crop genetic resources as a single category, 
this formulation suggested that the International Undertaking was a 
vehicle to challenge Breeders’ Rights. NGOs presented the idea of 
Farmers’ Rights to the FAO Commission in 1985.143 The authors of 
the Farmers’ Rights idea were antagonistic to Breeders’ Rights,144 
believing perhaps that international acceptance of Farmers’ Rights 
would undermine individual rights.145 
The gambit to undermine Breeders’ Rights through a binding 
international resolution146 endorsing unrestricted access to all genetic 
material failed because of political, practical, and conceptual 
problems. Politically, Farmers’ Rights were opposed by states that 
provided for Breeders’ Rights.147 The availability of large stocks of 
genetic resources in open collections148 used by nations in Vavilov 
Centers149 undercut the possibility of financing Farmers’ Rights 
through restricting the flow of crop genetic resources. Dutfield 
discusses conceptual problems in defining the term “farmer” in 
relation to Farmers’ Rights, ambiguity in who might hold these 
rights, and inconsistency in the fact that not all traditional farmers or 
farming communities conserve genetic resources.150 In addition, the 
possible reliance on a contractual mode of defining Farmers’ Rights 
 142. Res. 8/83, supra note 34, Annex, art. 2.1.2.v.  
 143. Pat Mooney, Viewpoint of Non-Governmental Organisations, in AGROBIODIVERSITY 
AND FARMERS’ RIGHTS 40 (M.S. Swaminathan ed., 1996). 
 144. Id. 
 145. FOWLER, supra note 34, at 187. 
 146. DUTFIELD, supra note 93, at 103 (2000). 
 147. Pat Roy Mooney, The Law of the Seed Revisited: Seed Wars at the Circo Massimo, 1 
DEV. DIALOG 1985, at 139, 150 (1985). 
 148. Stephen B. Brush, Valuing Crop Genetic Resources, 5 J. ENV’T & DEV. 416 (1996).  
 149. Fowler et al., supra note 13, at 189. 
 150. DUTFIELD, supra note 93, at 104. 
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may well exclude numerous farmers who create, maintain, and 
exchange crop genetic resources.151 The future of Farmers’ Rights, 
therefore, depended on accepting the coexistence of different rights 
for farmers and breeders. FAO Resolution 5/89 concluded that the 
two types of rights were not incompatible, and defining Farmers’ 
Rights as:  
[R]ights arising from the past, present and future contributions 
of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available 
plant genetic resources, particularly those in centres of 
origin/diversity . . . [T]hese rights are vested in the 
International Community as trustees for present and future 
generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits 
to farmers, and supporting the continuation of their 
contributions.152 
Like intellectual property, Farmers’ Rights were justified as a 
mechanism to encourage the creation of socially valuable goods 
(plant genetic resources). Farmers’ Rights differed from Breeders’ 
Rights in that they were to be vested in the “International 
Community” rather than in individuals. However, in not specifying 
what genetic materials were covered or who could claim ownership, 
the FAO definition created a problematic category. Even though the 
Farmers’ Rights idea was carried into Agenda 21, negotiations for 
implementing the CBD, and the Global Plan of Action for the 
Conservation and Sustainable use of Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (the 1996 Leipzig Conference),153 the idea has 
remained an elusive goal. Its early association with the anti-
Breeders’-Rights agenda, and its ambiguities regarding materials and 
holders of the rights thwarted its acceptance as an international 
principle or program. Following the ITPGRFA negotiation, the fate 
of Farmers’ Rights will be determined at the national level.  
The U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights observes 
that Farmers’ Rights are not intellectual property rights but rather 
 151. Stephen B. Brush, Bio-Cooperation and the Benefits of Crop Genetic Resources: The 
Case of Mexican Maize, 26 WORLD DEV. 755, 761 (1998). 
 152. STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 80, at 278. 
 153. Id. at 312; GIRSBERGER, supra note 93, at 183. 
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represent a mechanism to counterbalance Breeders’ Rights.154 
Farmers’ Rights differ from intellectual property by the rights 
conferred, the title holder, subject matter, and duration,155 and they 
are ambiguous for three of these criteria. The nature of the rights 
conferred by Farmers’ Rights hinges on the economic benefit that 
connected recognition of resources provided in the past and benefit 
sharing in the future. While these goals are embedded in the 
justification for Farmers’ Rights, no estimate of value or widely 
accepted method to estimate value of crop genetic resources are 
available. Consequently, the right to compensation for past 
contributions and benefit sharing for current and future use is largely 
metaphorical. Estimating value is obstructed by the absence of 
methods and data to assess the historic economic contribution of 
farmers’ varieties from Vavilov Centers and the lack of calculations 
of the cost of conserving them on-farm. Estimating the historic 
contribution of farmers’ varieties ideally requires one to separate the 
economic contribution of germplasm from other factors such as the 
development of physical infrastructure and human capital. The 
difficulty in doing this relegates the estimate to anecdotal evidence.156 
Likewise, estimating the cost of Farmers’ Rights is hampered by the 
lack of a program for how the stream of benefits to farmers might be 
used to achieve conservation goals.157 How holders of individual 
rights plan to use the benefits from intellectual property is not an 
issue because finite monopoly rights are expected to encourage more 
invention. If continued stewardship is the goal of Farmers’ Rights, 
then the recipients of an international stream of benefits who are 
acting on behalf of farmers need a plan. Bioprospecting contracts158 
to overcome the lack of economic valuation are inappropriate for 
crop genetic resources. These contracts are likely to be ineffective 
 154. CIPR, supra note 113, at 68. 
 155. See CORREA, supra note 134. 
 156. Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) of the U.N. Development 
Programme, Conserving Indigenous Knowledge—Integrating New Systems of Integration, 
(1995), available at http://www.undp.org/csopp/cso/newfiles/dociknowledge.html. 
 157. See STEPHEN B. BRUSH, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N, PROVIDING FARMERS’ 
RIGHTS THROUGH IN SITU CONSERVATION OF CROP GENETIC RESOURCES (Aug. 1994), 
available at ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/bsp/bsp3e.pdf. 
 158. Tobin, supra note 113, at 287. 
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conservation tools and may have detrimental economic effects. 
Because collecting genetic resources tends to be “single shot,”159 
collecting fees are unlikely to have a long-term conservation effect. I 
have written that contracts are likely to arbitrarily favor single 
communities or regions who have no special claim to crop 
germplasm.160 Barrett and Lybbert argue that bioprospecting 
windfalls may be exclusionary or even regressive.161 The reaction of 
groups who were excluded from bioprospecting agreements confirms 
that exclusion is a liability.162 
Possible titleholders of Farmers’ Rights include farming 
communities and states.163 The diffuse and obscure origin of most 
crop resources in Vavilov Centers can lead to challenges of one 
community’s claims for rights to a specific landrace or other crop 
resource by other communities. Transaction costs to settle such 
disputes may be higher than the value of the right, and arbitrary 
allocation presents ethical problems of favoring one community over 
others.164 If conceived as a market situation between community 
“sellers” and seed company “buyers,” Farmers’ Rights exist in a 
monopsony environment in which a multitude of farmers with 
genetic resources face an extremely limited set of potential “buyers.” 
Mendelsohn observes that this situation leads to market failure and 
argues that a monopoly acting on behalf of farmers is necessary.165 
Because preexisting agreements such as the CBD and the ITPGRFA 
recognize state ownership of genetic resources, Farmers’ Rights will 
logically be held by the state. Because Vavilov Centers cross national 
boundaries, a broad definition of protected material under Farmers’ 
 159. Christopher B. Barrett & Travis J. Lybbert, Is Bioprospecting a Viable Strategy for 
Conserving Tropical Ecosystems?, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 293 (2000); Brush, supra note 151, 
at 759–60. 
 160. Brush, supra note 151, at 760. 
 161. Barrett & Lybbert, supra note 159. 
 162. Ronald Nigh, Maya Medicine in the Biological Gaze: Bioprospecting Research as 
Herbal Fetishism, 43 CURRENT ANTHRO. 451 (2000). 
 163. See CORREA, supra note 134. 
 164. Brush, supra note 151, at 760. 
 165. Robert Mendelsohn, The Market Value of Farmers’ Rights, in AGRICULTURE AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (Vittorio Santaniello et al. eds., 2000). 
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Rights confronts the likelihood of disputes between countries. This 
possibility gave rise to a consortium approach by Andean nations.166 
The subject matter of Farmers’ Rights is equally ambiguous. The 
most commonly used term to describe crop genetic resources that are 
managed by farmers is “landrace,” but no widely accepted definition 
exists.167 Characterization of landraces with gene bank collections is 
limited, and much of the material is stored without adequate 
documentation to identify farmers who might be considered as the 
sources.168 Defining knowledge rather than genetic resources as the 
subject matter of Farmers’ Rights is equally problematic because 
farmers’ knowledge is local, widely shared, changeable, and orally 
transmitted. Lastly, the concept does not specify whether wild 
relatives of crops, which have provided valuable traits to crop 
improvement but are not known or used by farmers, are covered by 
Farmers’ Rights. Examples of wild crop relatives that have provided 
valuable germplasm include wild tomatoes in Peru169 and wild rice in 
Mali.170 
The final criterion that distinguishes Farmers’ Rights from 
intellectual property is their duration.171 The monopoly right of a 
grant of the intellectual property is made to be temporary as a way to 
balance the goal of increased invention over the goal of open 
competition. The unlimited duration of Farmers’ Rights foregoes this 
balance, a policy of dubious merit if other communities or nations 
have valuable genetic resources or prove to be more effective 
conservationists.  
In specifying national sovereignty, the CBD does not per se 
recognize or value the contributions of farmers in maintaining or 
providing genetic resources nor provide a vehicle for transferring 
 166. Liliana M. Davalos et al., Regulating Access to Genetic Resources Under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 12 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 1511, 1514 (2003); 
see also Manuel Ruiz, Decision 391: The Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources in 
the Andean Pact, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 110, at 379. 
 167. A.C. Zeven, Landraces: A Review of Definitions and Classifications, 104 EUPHYTICA 
127, 129 (1998). 
 168. Peeters & Williams, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
 169. Hugh H. Iltis, Discovery of No. 832: An Essay in Defense of the National Science 
Foundation, 3 DESERT PLANTS 175 (1982). 
 170. Pamela C. Ronald, Making Rice Disease-Resistant, 227 SCI. AM. 100, 101 (1997). 
 171. See CORREA, supra note 134. 
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value to communities where crop resources existed. However, prior 
to the CBD, Farmers’ Rights had run as a subtext beneath 
negotiations about regulating access to crop genetic resources,172 and 
farming communities’ interests were recognized in Agenda 21’s 
discussion of rural development that precedes the section on 
biodiversity conservation.173 Nevertheless, in the 2001 final draft of 
the ITPGRFA, Farmers’ Rights remained largely programmatic and 
without specific implementing instruments. These rights survive in 
Article 9 of the ITPGRFA as an acknowledgement of the 
contributions of farmers to the welfare of humankind. The ITPGRFA 
moves away from the initial strategy of a binding international 
resolution to create Farmers’ Rights and confirms that realizing 
Farmers’ Rights rests with national governments. The treaty inveighs 
on its Contracting Parties to provide for these rights in three ways: 
(a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture; 
(b) the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising 
from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture; and  
(c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national 
level on matters related to the conservation and sustainable use 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.174 
As in the ex ante, common heritage period, farmers are not 
granted a favored status as owners of genetic resources that they have 
inherited and maintained. The ITPGRFA does not vest farmers with a 
property right allowing them to exclude others from using or 
benefiting from crop resources.  
Negotiating Farmers’ Rights at the national level faces obstacles 
that were not critical in the international arena, such as political 
 172. See, e.g., Final Consensus Report: Global Initiative for the Security and Sustainable 
Use of Plant Genetic Resources, Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic 
Resources, Oslo Plenary Session (1991). 
 173. Secretary General of the Conference, Promoting Sustainable Agriculture and Rural 
Development, UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.19, in AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED 
PROCEEDINGS 397 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1992). 
 174. ITPGRFA, supra note 122, art. 9.2(a)–(c). 
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weakness of the traditional farming sector, urban and consumer 
demand for low cost commodities, and the need to promote 
agricultural development. Although the CBD does not distinguish 
crop genes as a special category of biological resource, negotiations 
for Farmers’ Rights will have to separate crop genes and 
acknowledge the regime established by the ITPGRFA. We have 
gained appreciation of traditional farmers’ varieties, or landraces, as 
collective inventions and metapopulations rather than as assets that 
are privately derived and managed.175 Significant proportions of most 
nations’ agricultural sectors have benefited from adopting new 
technology, including new crop varieties, but landraces still meet 
farmers’ needs in specific agricultural niches.176 The demand for crop 
genetic resources is greatest in developing countries,177 while in 
industrial countries it is modest and satisfied by resources that have 
already been collected.178 Finally, a large number of parties have 
direct interest and influence in negotiating a new regime for 
biological resources.179 For crop genetic resources these interests 
crosscut national boundaries, public and private sectors, and rural and 
urban communities. At the very least, the parties who are direct stake 
holders in the issue include subsistence and commercial farmers, crop 
breeders in the public and private sectors, national and international 
gene banks, the agricultural development service sector, private seed 
companies, and crop scientists. 
Experience gained in research and negotiation about possible 
mechanisms to protect farmers’ knowledge offer four guidelines for 
crafting national Farmers’ Rights programs: 
 175. See Louette, supra note 59; KARL S. ZIMMERER, CHANGING FORTUNES: 
BIODIVERSITY AND PEASANT LIVELIHOOD IN THE PERUVIAN ANDES 113 (1996). 
 176. Stephen B. Brush, In Situ Conservation of Landraces in Centers of Crop Diversity, 35 
CROP SCI. 346 (1995); see also David A. Cleveland et al., Do Folk Crop Varieties Have a Role 
in Sustainable Agriculture?, 44 BIOSCIENCE 740, 745 (Dec. 1994). 
 177. SMALE ET AL., supra note 13.  
 178. D.R. Marshall, Limitations to the Use of Germplasm Collections, in THE USE OF 
GERMPLASM COLLECTIONS 105–20 (A.H.D. Brown et al. eds., 1989); see also John P. Peeters 
& Nick W. Galwey, Germplasm Collections and Breeding Needs in Europe, 42 ECON. BOTANY 
503 (1988). 
 179. Charles V. Barber et al., Developing and Implementing National Measures for Genetic 
Resources Access Regulation and Benefit-Sharing, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 110, at 363, 385. 
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1. The goals of Farmers’ Rights are to balance Breeders’ Rights 
and encourage farmers to continue as stewards and providers 
of crop genetic resources. 
2. Farmers’ Rights are held collectively rather than by individual 
farmers or communities. 
3. Farmers’ Rights are not exclusive or meant to limit access to 
genetic resources. 
4. Mechanisms are needed to share benefits received by the 
international community from genetic material from farmers’ 
fields or international collections. 
These principles frame the ITPGRFA and they are evident in two 
models for implementing Farmers’ Rights: India’s Act No. 53, for the 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights180 and the 
Organization of African Unity’s African Model Legislation for the 
Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and 
Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources.181  
VI. FARMERS’ RIGHTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
GRAIN reports that six countries182 (Bangladesh, Brazil, India, 
Panama, Peru, and the Philippines) and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) have drafted legislation or model legislation relating to 
Farmers’ Rights. Bangladesh, India, and the OAU envision these 
rights as part of national systems for plant variety protection, while 
Brazil, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines envision special rights for 
traditional knowledge that possibly includes crop materials as 
collective property. In some instances, such as Costa Rica’s183 
 180. The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, India Act 53 (2001) 
[hereinafter India Act], available at http://grain.org/brl_files/india-pvp-2001-en.pdf. 
 181. OAU, AFRICAN MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES, FARMERS AND BREEDERS, AND FOR THE REGULATION OF ACCESS TO 
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (2000) [hereinafter AFRICAN MODEL LEGISLATION], available at 
http://grain.org/brl_files/oau-model-law-en.pdf. 
 182. Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN), Farmers’ Rights (Sept. 9, 2004), at 
http://grain.org/brl/?typeid=45. 
 183. Ley de Protección de los Derechos de los Fitomejoradores, Costa Rica Law 15.487 
(2003) [hereinafter Costa Rica Law]; India Act, supra note 180. 
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proposed Law for the Protection of Plant Breeders’ Rights,184 
Farmers’ Rights are provided by following policies in plant variety 
protection185 that allow farmers the right to re-sow, exchange, 
segregate, and sell the produce from protected varieties described in 
the 1978 version of the UPOV system.186 In other instances, such as 
India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act,187 
Farmers’ Rights are expanded beyond this to include the right to 
benefits from collection and use of landraces to produce 
commercially registered varieties. Collective rights systems, such as 
those in Panama188 and Peru,189 regulate use of collective property 
through national registers and in the case of Peru through licensing of 
collectively owned biological resources. The collective rights 
approach is primarily aimed at protecting folklore, artistic expression, 
and plant knowledge associated with natural products and medicines 
rather than crops per se.  
India’s Act No. 53, Article 16d, affirms that farmers or a 
community of farmers may petition to register a new variety as the 
breeder, but it goes beyond this logical extension of Breeders’ Rights 
to recognize Farmers’ Rights in four ways. First, farmers’ roles as 
keepers of genetic resources and sustainers of crop evolution are to 
be recognized and rewarded through a National Gene Fund. This 
 184. John H. Barton, Acquiring Protection for Improved Germplasm and Inbred Lines, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 19, 22 (Frederic H. 
Erbisch & Karim M. Maredia eds., 1998); see also Silvia Salazar, Costa Rica, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra, at 179, 184; 
Costa Rica Law, supra note 183. 
 185. UPOV, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Union 
Pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales) is an intergovernmental organization with 
headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland). UPOV was established by the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, adopted in Paris in 1961 and it was revised in 
1972, 1978 and 1991. Barton, supra note 184; see also Robert E. Evenson, Intellectual 
Property Rights, Access to Plant Germplasm, and Crop Production Scenarios in 2020, 39 CROP 
SCI. 1630, 1631 (1999). 
 186. UPOV, The UPOV System of Plant Variety Protection (2002), at 
http://www.upov.int/en/about/upov_system.htm. 
 187. India Act, supra note 180. 
 188. Regimen Especial de Propriedad Intelectual Sobre los Derechos Colectivos de los 
Pueblos Indigenas, Panama Law No. 20 (June 26, 2000), translation available at 
http://grain.org/brl/?docid=461&lawid=2002. 
 189. Propuesta de Regimen de Protección de los Conocimientos Colectivos de los Pueblos 
y Comunidades Indígenas Vinculados a los Recursos Biológicos, Peru Law 27,811 (June 10, 
2002), translation available at http://grain.org/brl/?docid=81&lawid=2041. 
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Fund will be used for benefit sharing and to support in situ and ex situ 
conservation, and it will be financed by annual fees levied on 
breeders of registered varieties, depending on the value of the royalty 
earned from a registered variety. Benefit sharing to communities that 
provided germplasm used in a registered variety will be determined 
according to the extent and nature of the use of genetic material in the 
registered variety and the commercial value of the variety.190 Second, 
India’s Act No. 53 establishes the farmers’ exemption that was 
present in early plant variety protection regimes of the U.S. and 
UPOV,191 allowing farmers to “save, use, sow, resow, exchange, 
share or sell his farm produce including seed of a variety protected 
under this Act in the same manner as he was entitled before the 
coming into force of this Act.”192 Third, breeders are required to 
disclose in their application for registration information regarding 
tribal or rural families’ use of genetic material used in the breeding 
program. Failure to disclose this information is grounds for rejecting 
an application for variety registration. Fourth, any interested party 
may file a claim on behalf of a village or local community stating its 
contribution to the evolution of a registered variety. If this claim is 
substantiated, the breeder is required to pay compensation to the 
National Gene Fund.  
The African Model Legislation establishes Farmers’ Rights in 
four ways. First, it allows farmers to certify their varieties as 
intellectual property without meeting the criteria of distinction, 
uniformity, and stability that breeders must meet. This certificate 
provides farmers with “the exclusive rights to multiply, cultivate, use 
or sell the variety, or to license its use.”193 Second, farmers are given 
the right to “obtain an equitable share of benefits arising from the use 
of plant and animal genetic resources.”194 The African Model Law 
Article 66 establishes a Community Gene Fund to accomplish benefit 
sharing and to be financed by royalties fixed to registered breeders’ 
 190. India Act, supra note 180, art. 26(5). 
 191. David J. Houser, Exemptions Under Patents and Certificates Covering Plants and 
Comments on Material Transfer Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 
43, at 107, 108. 
 192. India Act, supra note 180, art. 39(iv). 
 193. African Model Legislation, supra note 181, art. 25. 
 194. Id. art. 26. 
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varieties. Third, farmers are guaranteed an exemption to Breeders’ 
Rights restrictions to “collectively save, use, multiply and process 
farm-saved seed of protected varieties.”195 Fourth, farmers’ varieties 
are to be certified as being derived from “the sustainable use [of] a 
biological resource.”196 This certificate does not imply financial 
reward.  
A pattern for Farmers’ Rights is evident in the provisions of the 
ITPGRFA, India’s Act No. 53, and the African Model Legislation. 
All three accept the co-existence of Breeders’ Rights along with 
Farmers’ Rights, and all intend to accomplish benefit sharing through 
a centralized funding mechanism and the duties levied on income 
streams from Breeders’ Rights. This same benefit sharing mechanism 
is present in the Genetic Resources Recognition Fund (GRRF) of the 
University of California that imposes a licensing fee on the 
commercialization of patented plant material involving germplasm 
from Developing Countries.197 The ITPGRFA and GRRF envision 
this mechanism as a generic tool for reciprocity rather than one to 
reward specific farmers or communities. The African Model 
Legislation goes furthest in signifying individual communities as the 
beneficiaries. India’s Act No. 53 combines both the generic and 
specific uses of compensation through the centralized gene fund. 
Farmers’ Rights are also provided in farmers’ exemptions to 
restrictions embedded in Breeders’ Rights. Contradicting the view 
that Farmers’ Rights are not a form of intellectual property,198 the 
Model African Law goes beyond the ITPGRFA and India’s Act No. 
53 in granting exclusive rights to farmers over their varieties. 
Implementation of national systems for Farmers’ Rights is still 
untested, although the Indian plan has been passed by both houses of 
the Indian Parliament and received the President’s support.199 The 
 195. Id. art. 26(1)(f). 
 196. Id. art. 27(1). 
 197. Pamela Ronald & Stephen Brush, Genetic Resources Recognition at the University of 
California, Davis, 35 IN VITRO REP. 8 (2001); KERRY TEN KATE & AMANDA COLLIS, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, BENEFIT-SHARING CASE STUDY, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/case-studies/abs/cs-abs-ucdavis.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2004). 
 198. W. Lesser, Intellectual Property Rights Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
in AGRICULTURE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 35; see also CIPR, 
supra note 113.  
 199. Asha Krishnakumar, For Farmers’ Rights, FRONTLINE, Feb. 16–Mar. 1, 2002, 
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success of rights set forth in India’s Act No. 53, the ITPGRFA, and 
the African Model Legislation hinge on the value of certified crop 
varieties that use germplasm obtained from farmers and the 
transaction costs of determining which farmers should be 
beneficiaries.  
The value of certified varieties is not fully known in India or 
Africa, but two factors indicate that their value will offer meager 
resources to finance Farmers’ Rights. First, the experience of 
Western, industrialized countries shows that plant variety certificates 
have relatively low or negligible value. Lesser looked at the value of 
plant variety certificates for soybeans in New York State, determined 
that the price premium associated with certified seed was only 2.3%, 
and concluded that this form of protection is too weak to be an 
incentive to breeders.200 A similar result in India would not generate 
any appreciable revenue to fund Farmers’ Rights. It is possible that 
“stronger” intellectual property means, such as utility patents, would 
increase revenue, but both India and the OAU reject patenting of 
plants. Second, modern breeding programs increasingly are 
dependent on the use of “elite” breeding lines that are several 
generations removed from farmers varieties and show increasingly 
complex pedigrees involving crop genetic resources from many 
sources.201 Although India is a net exporter of landraces as breeding 
material, foreign landraces are as important to India’s rice program as 
are national landraces.202 Because African agriculture is heavily 
dependent on crops originating in other regions, dependence on 
international germplasm is high. For instance, in Nigeria’s rice 
breeding program, 180 out of 195 landrace progenitors used in 
breeding were borrowed from other countries.203 Estimating the 
contribution of a single landrace or collection to the value of a 
available at http://www.flonnet.com/fl1904/19040800.htm. 
 200. W. Lesser, Valuation of Plant Variety Protection Certificates, 16 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 
231 (1994). 
 201. M. Smale et al., Dimensions of Diversity in Modern Spring Bread Wheat in 
Developing Countries from 1965, 42 CROP SCI. 1766 (2002). 
 202. Douglas Gollin & Robert E. Evenson, An Application of Hedonic Pricing Methods to 
Value Rice Genetic Resources in India, in AGRICULTURAL VALUES OF PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES 139 (Robert E. Evenson et al. eds., 1998). 
 203. Douglas Gollin, Valuing Farmers’ Rights, in AGRUCULTURAL VALUES OF PLANT 
GENETIC RESOURCES 233 (Robert E. Evenson et al. eds., 1998). 
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modern variety has not been accomplished and is likely to become 
more difficult as pedigrees become more complex.204  
Transaction costs in determining which farmers or communities 
should receive compensation through the national gene funds are 
equally problematic to financing Farmers’ Rights. If equity is a 
concern, it is inappropriate to simply assign rights to the community 
where collection occurred because of the metapopulation aspect of 
landraces.205 Exclusionary rights have proven to be politically 
unacceptable because of this issue.206 Even if an arbitrary recognition 
of rights is made, farmers who are excluded but who have the same 
resources may offer their resources at competitive prices setting off a 
downward price spiral that is unfavorable to farmers and 
conservation.207 Transaction costs can be lowered by establishing a 
national monopoly208 but this contradicts the terms of India’s Act No. 
53 and the African Model Legislation.  
In sum, Farmers’ Rights are a moral but largely rhetorical 
recognition of the contribution of farmers to the world’s stock of 
genetic resources. They provide only a limited mechanism to share 
the benefits of using crop genetic resources or to promote their 
conservation. 
VII. TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
The interplay between biological variation and its control through 
selection makes crop and natural evolution similar to one another, but 
the two differ by virtue of the role of “artificial” selection by humans 
in crop evolution.209 Darwin laid out the basic framework of crop 
evolution that distinguishes two types of human selection: methodical 
and unconscious.210 According to Darwin, unconscious selection is 
 204. Gollin & Evenson, supra note 202. 
 205. Brush, supra note 151, at 760–61. 
 206. Nigh, supra note 162, at 462. 
 207. Mendelsohn, supra note 165; Barrett & Lybbert, supra note 159. 
 208. Mendelsohn, supra note 165. 
 209. HAWKES, supra note 9; C. M. Donald & J. Hamblin, The Convergent Evolution of 
Annual Seed Crops in Agriculture, 36 ADVANCES IN AGRONOMY 97, 99–100 (1983). 
 210. 20 CHARLES DARWIN, Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, Volume 
II, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DARWIN 153 (Paul H. Barrett & R.B. Freeman eds., New York 
University Press 1988). 
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inadvertent and arises when people generally favor a superior cultivar 
without specific selection for individual traits.211 More recent models 
of crop evolution re-label unconscious selection as “nonspecific 
selection.”212 Methodical, or conscious selection, which is methodical 
and specific, is the more important contribution of humans to the 
evolution of crops.213 For the vast majority of crop evolution, 
conscious selection has been decentralized and managed by farmers. 
In the past century, the organization of crop breeding programs has 
centralized selection and given an important role in crop evolution to 
scientists, public agencies, and seed companies.214 
Conscious selection by farmers implies the use of knowledge 
systems about the crop and its environment, which are subsets of 
more general traditional and indigenous knowledge systems.215 While 
“traditional knowledge” and “indigenous knowledge” are not 
synonymous, they share many attributes, such as being unwritten, 
customary, pragmatic, experiential, and holistic. The terms are 
frequently used in the same context to distinguish the knowledge of 
traditional and indigenous communities from other types of 
knowledge, such as the knowledge of scientific and industrial 
communities.216 Indeed, the primary distinction between traditional 
and indigenous knowledge pertains to the holders rather than the 
knowledge per se. Traditional knowledge is a broader category that 
includes indigenous knowledge as a type of traditional knowledge 
held by indigenous communities.217  
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Daniel Zohary, Unconscious Selection and the Evolution of Domesticated 
Plants, 58 ECON. BOTANY 5 (2004); EVANS, supra note 15, at 267. 
 213. HARLAN, supra note 10, at 127; David Rindos, Darwinism and its Role in the 
Explanation of Domestication, in FORAGING AND FARMING 27, 29 (David R. Harris & Gordon 
C. Hillman eds., 1989). 
 214. Poehlman, supra note 28. 
 215. Roy Ellen & Holly Harris, Introduction, in INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS 1, 7 (Roy Ellen et al. eds., 2000); Paul Sillitoe, The 
Development of Indigenous Knowledge, 39 CURRENT ANTHRO. 223, 226–29 (1998). 
 216. Arun Agrawal, Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge, 
26 DEV. & CHANGE 413, 422 (1995); Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the 
Patent Office, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 111 (2005); Manuel Ruiz, The International Debate 
on Traditional Knowledge as Prior Art in the Patent System (Center for International 
Environmental Law 2002), at http://ciel.org/Publications/PriorArt_ManuelRuiz_Oct02.pdf; 
Sillitoe, supra note 215. 
 217. John Mugabe, Intellectual Property Protection and Traditional Knowledge, in World 
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While traditional knowledge has emerged in international 
discourse on new legal mechanisms,218 indigenous knowledge is a 
term long in use by anthropologists and other investigators of non-
industrialized societies;219 because of this history, indigenous 
knowledge enjoys a more elaborated discussion and definition than 
the more inclusive term. Nevertheless, apart from the designation of 
the type of holder, the definitions applied to indigenous knowledge 
apply also to traditional knowledge. While Kongolo observes that 
“[t]raditional knowledge is rarely defined within the national, 
regional, and international frameworks,”220 indigenous knowledge 
has been extensively analyzed by ethnobotanists and others,221 so it 
behooves us to utilize the analysis of indigenous knowledge to 
grapple with traditional knowledge. Both are associated with folk 
nomenclatures and taxonomies of plants222 and the environment223 
and in practical domains such as disease etiology224 and agricultural 
practices.225 Distinguishing between indigenous knowledge and other 
knowledge systems has proven to be problematic,226 but 
anthropologists and others argue that a number of criteria can be used 
to differentiate indigenous knowledge from other knowledge systems. 
Indigenous knowledge’s distinguishing characteristics include (1) 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97 
(1999). 
 218. Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 1 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 555, 561–68 (1998); Pires de Carvalho, supra note 216; W.B. Wendland, 
Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: WIPO’s Exploratory Program, 33 
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 485 (2003). 
 219. Sillitoe, supra note 215, at 223. 
 220. Tshimanga Kongolo, Towards a More Balanced Coexistence of Traditional 
Knowledge and Pharmaceuticals Protection in Africa, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 349, 357 (2001). 
 221. BRENT BERLIN, ETHNOBIOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION 4 (1992); Sillitoe, supra note 
215. 
 222. BRENT BERLIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF TZELTAL PLANT CLASSIFICATION 25–28 
(1974); Scott Atran et al., Folkecology and Commons Management in the Maya Lowlands, 96 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 7598, 7600 (1999). 
 223. See, e.g., Deirdre M. Birmingham, Local Knowledge of Soils: The Case of Contrast in 
Côte d’Ivoire, 111 GEODERMA 481, 484 (2003); Jeffery W. Bentley & Gonzalo Rodríguez, 
Honduran Folk Entomology, 42 CURRENT ANTHRO. 285, 289–95 (2001). 
 224. See, e.g., ELOIS ANN BERLIN & BRENT BERLIN, MEDICAL ETHNOBIOLOGY OF THE 
HIGHLAND MAYA OF CHIAPAS, MEXICO: THE GASTROINTESTINAL DISEASES 54 (1996). 
 225. MARGOT BEYERSDORFF, LEXICO AGROPECUARIO QUECHUA (1984); ROBERTO J. 
GONZÁLEZ, ZAPOTEC SCIENCE 130–54 (2001). 
 226. See Agrawal, supra note 216, at 425. 
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localness, (2) oral transmission, (3) origin in practical experience, (4) 
emphasis on the empirical rather than theoretical, (5) repetitiveness, 
(6) changeability, (7) being widely shared, (8) fragmentary 
distribution, (9) orientation to practical performance, and (10) 
holism.227 These same characteristics apply to traditional knowledge. 
Traditional agricultural knowledge is understandably responsible 
for guiding the past and present accomplishments of most of the 
world’s farmers. The primary development of crops and cropping 
systems occurred before the relatively recent discoveries of 
agricultural chemistry and crop biology,228 and most of the world’s 
farmers still rely on traditional knowledge rather than on formal, 
scientific knowledge. The hyperbolic growth of agricultural 
production may now rely on formal science, but it is built on 
foundations developed by traditional farmers.  
Traditional knowledge for crop genetic resources has both 
cognitive and biological aspects. The cognitive aspect is embodied in 
the nomenclatures, classificatory systems, and cultural practices of 
farmers, while the biological aspect is embodied in crop germplasm 
from generations of observation, election, exchange, and 
maintenance. Both aspects of traditional knowledge have fuzzy 
boundaries because of their protean and fragmented nature. 
Traditional knowledge has been described for numerous farming 
systems,229 and its value is evident in such specific activities as 
designing and managing irrigation,230 coping with marginal farming 
environments,231 enhancing production with local inputs,232 and 
developing crop diversity.233  
 227. Ellen & Harris, supra note 215, at 4–5. 
 228. EVANS, supra note 87, at 90.  
 229. See GONZÁLEZ, supra note 225, at 130ff. 
 230. FRANCESCA BRAY, THE RICE ECONOMIES 68 (1986). 
 231. PEDRO A. SANCHEZ, PROPERTIES AND MANAGEMENT OF SOILS IN THE TROPICS 377 
(1976); Karl S. Zimmerer, Soil Erosion and Labor Shortages in the Andes with Special 
Reference to Bolivia, 1953–91, 21 WORLD DEV. 1659, 1661 (1993). 
 232. GENE C. WILKEN, GOOD FARMERS: TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 46–69 (1987) (describing soil management 
using organic amendments). 
 233. Daniela Soleri & David A. Cleveland, Farmers’ Genetic Perceptions Regarding Their 
Crop Populations: An Example with Maize in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico, 55 ECON. 
BOTANY 106 (2001). 
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While the existence and accomplishments of traditional 
agricultural knowledge are unquestioned, its defining characteristics 
pose severe obstacles for its valuation and protection by farmers and 
outside interests such as conservationists, indigenous rights activists, 
and rural development agencies. Indeed, outside efforts to value, 
promote, and protect traditional knowledge appear inevitably to 
distort it and its social context.234 A severe obstacle to valuation and 
protection is the disarticulation of different types of knowledge when 
that information is local, orally transmitted, practical, and 
fragmentary in distribution. Agricultural knowledge is comprised of 
numerous substantive domains such as soil types, pests, pathogens, 
and crop genotypes, domains for environmental conditions such as 
rainfall and temperature patterns, and management domains such as 
irrigation techniques, soil amendments, planting patterns, pest 
control, weed control, and crop selection. Brookfield and Stocking 
add organization as a third domain that includes tenure arrangements, 
resource allocation, and dependency on alternative production 
spheres.235 These domains are demarcated by distinct lexicons and 
nomenclatures such as crop variety names or terminology for 
management practices. Traditional knowledge is rife with “covert 
categories”236 and unlabeled, intermediate domains237 that may link 
substantive and management domains but require intensive research 
to understand. These substantive and management domains are 
logically articulated in the minds and memories of individual farmers, 
but they may appear disarticulated in a wider social context and to 
outsiders.  
Capturing the knowledge in a single domain by collecting its 
nomenclature, such as crop variety names, is relatively easy but of 
limited use. The content of a single domain may be ordered 
taxonomically, but revealing taxonomy requires elaborate analysis 
similar to biological systematics that sift and winnow the clutter and 
 234. Michael R. Dove, Center, Periphery, and Biodiversity, in VALUING LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE 41 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky, eds., 1996). 
 235. Harold Brookfield & Michael Stocking, Agrodiversity: Definition, Description and 
Design, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 77, 79 (1999). 
 236. BERLIN, supra note 221, at 176. 
 237. Stephen B. Brush, Ethnoecology, Biodiversity, and Modernization in Andean Potato 
Agriculture, 12 J. ETHNOBIOLOGY 161, 163–67 (1992). 
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noise of variation.238 Folk nomenclatures are unevenly distributed and 
disparate among individuals and localities.239 Because traditional 
knowledge is most developed when a domain’s salience is high,240 
nomenclature for crops and agriculture is often embellished, for 
instance, in the wealth of variety names found in small regions.241 
Unfortunately, the elaboration of folk nomenclature for crops is 
greatest at the variety (infra-specific) level that is often judged as 
having dubious value by botanists242 and ethnobotanists.243 Since 
variety names are orally transmitted, repetitive, widely shared, and 
fragmentary, name lists cannot be used directly to estimate genetic 
diversity or population structure above the farm level.244 Synonyms 
may, in fact, be known to some farmers but not marked or widely 
recognized. Problems of over- and under-classification of genetic 
variation can only be resolved by careful agronomic and genetic 
characterization, a step that would seem to obviate the need to collect 
folk names. The fact that traditional knowledge is orally transmitted 
and changeable creates problems in identifying truly local and 
autochthonous knowledge.245 The fact that traditional knowledge is 
local, empirical, and holistic suggests that indigenous people do not 
have to worry about consistency over wider areas, as plant collectors 
and geneticists must if they are trying to find traits that are locally 
abundant but not widespread.246  
Linking nomenclatures of substantive domains to one another and 
to management domains is complicated by the inherent qualities of 
localness, oral transmission, and fragmented distribution. The best 
studies showing linkage between different domains (e.g., crop 
 238. BERLIN, supra note 221. 
 239. Quiros et al., supra note 6.  
 240. BERLIN, supra note 221, at 255. 
 241. Brush, supra note 237; HAROLD C. CONKLIN, HANUNÓO AGRIGULTURE: A REPORT 
ON AN INTEGRAL SYSTEM OF SHIFTING CULTIVATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 112–13 (1957) 
(reporting over ninety rice varieties among the Hanunoo of the Philippines). 
 242. See B.L. Burtt, Infraspecific Categories in Flowering Plants, 2 BIO’L J. LINNEAN 
SOC’Y 233 (1970). 
 243. BERLIN, supra note 221, at 34. 
 244. Brush et al., supra note 56, at 1191; Quiros et al., supra note 6, at 256. 
 245. Dove, supra note 234. 
 246. D.R. Marshall & A.H.D. Brown, Optimum Sampling Strategies in Genetic 
Conservation, in CROP GENETIC RESOURCES FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW 53 (O.H. Frankel & 
J.G. Hawkes eds., 1975). 
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diversity and local ecological conditions or disease etiology and 
ethnobotany) are executed in single communities or micro-regions.247 
Linking multiple domains, such as crop type, soils, and plant 
diseases, or showing how domains are linked across regions are 
daunting tasks and generally not attempted in research on traditional 
agricultural systems. Of course, formal science overcomes the 
linkage problem by institutionalizing knowledge through educational 
curricula, instruction and examination, technical manuals, peer 
review, publication, and intellectual property. 
These characteristics and problems of traditional knowledge have 
limited its use by crop scientists and others outside of local farming 
systems. Because detailed information on farmer knowledge is 
usually not part of the passport data accompanying crop resources 
and may be difficult to interpret or verify, crop scientists who are 
looking for particular traits test collections according to ecological 
background or, more commonly, use well known germplasm (“elite 
breeding lines”) developed in experiment station research. 
Wellhausen et al., who pioneered research on maize diversity in 
MesoAmerica, opined that indigenous people had consciously 
contributed little to the evolution of maize under domestication.248 
Only recently have plant collectors and crop conservationists begun 
to collect traditional knowledge along with other ecological 
information.249 Usually only the local name is collected as part of the 
passport data that accompanies collections.250  
VIII. PROTECTING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
Agricultural development, through the expansion of crop land, 
improved management, inputs to crop production, and increasing 
yield potential, has allowed exponential population growth without a 
 247. BERLIN & BERLIN, supra note 224; Mauricio R. Bellon & J. Edward Taylor, “Folk” 
Soil Taxonomy and the Partial Adoption of New Seed Varieties, 41 ECON. DEV. & SOC. 
CHANGE 763 (1993). 
 248. E. J. WELLHAUSEN ET AL., RACES OF MAIZE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 29 (1957) 
(National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Publication 511). 
 249. IPGRI, Indigenous Knowledge Documentation (2001), at http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/ 
regions/apo/ik.html. 
 250. IPGRI, Multi-Crop Passport Descriptors (2005), available at 
http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/publications/pubfile.asp?id_pub=124. 
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Malthusian calamity. However, projected global population 
expansion to ten billion people is likely to exceed historic and 
important sources of agricultural growth, such as the addition of crop 
land and irrigation.251 Consequently, satisfying demand for additional 
agricultural production will depend on enhancing the biological 
capacity of major crops.252 The two most important sources of crop 
genes for this enhancement will be gene banks and farmers’ fields 
where traditional crops and crop evolutionary processes continue. 
Crop scientists and agricultural developers have prepared for this 
exigency by assembling large collections of genetic resources in gene 
banks and making them available for crop improvement.253 By 1970, 
an international framework for collection, conservation, utilization, 
and exchange was in place. This framework was epitomized by the 
creation of the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources, 
world collections of principal crops at international agricultural 
research centers such as the International Rice Research Institute, and 
national collections such as those of the National Seed Storage 
Laboratory in Fort Collins, Colorado.254  
Both the cognitive and biological aspects of traditional 
agricultural knowledge are endangered in the contemporary world by 
such processes as population growth, market development, 
technology diffusion, and cultural change. We have long accepted the 
notion that traditional agricultural knowledge is valuable and worth 
saving, and individuals, nations, and international groups have 
invested in conserving that knowledge for future generations.255  
Achieving the goal of protecting traditional agricultural 
knowledge may mean either protecting the cognitive or the biological 
aspects of crops. For most crops, protection against loss of traditional 
agricultural knowledge has given almost exclusive priority to ex situ 
(off-farm) measures for conserving germplasm in gene banks, 
 251. EVANS, supra note 15, at 368; Paul E. Waggoner, How Much Land Can Ten Billion 
People Spare for Nature?, 17 TECH. IN SOC’Y 17 (1995). 
 252. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC RESOURCES: 
AGRICULTURAL CROP ISSUES AND POLICIES (1993). 
 253. STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 80, at 140. 
 254. Id. at 83; PISTORIUS & VAN WIJK, supra note 34, at 98; PLUCKNETT ET AL., supra note 
30, at 110. 
 255. STATE OF THE WORLD, supra note 80, at 53, 60ff. 
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breeders’ collections, and botanical gardens.256 While ex situ 
conservation has become institutionalized at both national and 
international levels,257 crop scientists increasingly recognize the need 
to conserve crop genetic resources in situ in the habitats where they 
have evolved.258 Because elemental processes of crop evolution, such 
as selection, exchange, and dispersal, are guided by farmers’ 
knowledge, the preservation of farmers’ knowledge systems is 
essential to ongoing crop evolution. 
Conserving the cognitive aspects of traditional agricultural 
knowledge takes on added value because crop scientists and 
conservationists now accept the idea that crop genetic resources and 
crop evolutionary processes should be conserved in situ (on-farm).259 
In situ conservation for crop resources takes place on farms and with 
the management of crop populations by farmers through selection, 
use, exchange, and bequest. In situ conservation is distinguished 
because it is dynamic, decentralized, and aimed at conserving 
dynamic crop evolutionary processes rather than a static inventory of 
crop types.260 Rather than preserve diversity per se, in situ 
conservation aims to preserve decentralized selection, farmer seed 
production and exchange, and gene flow among crop varieties and 
with wild relatives. While in situ conservation and the preservation of 
traditional agricultural knowledge may be seen as synonymous, it is 
erroneous to imagine that traditional agricultural knowledge can be 
preserved as a given inventory of information, nomenclature, or local 
understandings of crops and crop ecology. Because both crops and 
knowledge systems are dynamic, in situ conservation can preserve 
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the context of practice of traditional knowledge rather than the 
knowledge itself. 
However, institutions or programs similar to those that have been 
established for ex situ conservation are either lacking or 
underdeveloped for protecting in situ resources. Crop scientists and 
others have made initial but important steps toward developing 
methods for achieving in situ conservation.261 These steps include 
means to increase the value of traditional crops to farmers through 
collaborative plant breeding and market development and improving 
the supply of traditional varieties and seed through diversity fairs and 
farmer networks. Numerous pilot research and conservation projects 
have been implemented in Vavilov Centers with financial support 
from private foundations, such as the McKnight Foundation’s 
Collaborative Crop Research Program262 and international agencies 
such as the Global Environmental Facility.263 Ex situ conservation 
agencies, such as the International Plant Genetic Resources 
Institute264 have moved to support in situ conservation as part of the 
overall effort to protect crop resources, and several counties have 
adopted the goal of promoting in situ conservation of crop resources 
as part of their national biodiversity agenda.265 Nevertheless, 
protecting the cognitive aspect of traditional agricultural knowledge 
is ad hoc, tentative and programmatic rather than institutionalized. 
Funding a broad and institutionalized program of in situ conservation 
will most likely be accomplished through conventional bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms that have successfully managed international 
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agricultural development in the past.266 The bioprospecting 
alternative is too limited in the number of farmers and duration to be 
adequate for the needs of national in situ conservation in Vavilov 
Centers or elsewhere. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Numerous parties and participants have struggled with the issue of 
protecting traditional agricultural knowledge and crop resources 
through binding international resolutions, formal contracting, and 
non-contractual benefit sharing mechanisms. The impetus for this 
was the recognition that resources and knowledge were eroding under 
the pressures of modernization, such as rapid population growth and 
commercialization of agriculture, but it also grew out of the 
North/South dialog of the mid-twentieth century. The move to end 
common heritage as a management scheme for genetic resources is 
understandable as both a liberal ideology to overcome the Tragedy of 
the Commons267 and an anti-colonialist tool to stop uncompensated 
acquisition of resources from the South.268 However, both of these 
sources for justifying the closure of the genetic commons are 
problematic because they are based on inaccurate caricatures of 
traditional resource managers and the international crop germplasm 
system. The Tragedy of the Commons overlooks successful and long-
lived systems of managing common pool resources,269 and the 
North/South dialog assumes that farmers are barefoot equivalents of 
crop breeders, overlooking incremental, collective invention,270 
networks of interdependence among farming communities,271 and 
farmers’ links to a global flow of crop material.272 Moreover, the 
 266. Robert W. Herdt, Assisting Developing Countries Toward Food Self-Reliance, 95 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 1989, 1990 (1998); Bruce Trotter & Ann Gordon, Charting 
Change in Official Assistance to Agriculture, 25 FOOD POL’Y 115, 120 (2000). 
 267. Hardin, supra note 33. 
 268. MOONEY, supra note 52; Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 555, 559 (1998). 
 269. OSTROM, supra note 38, at 58.  
 270. Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1983). 
 271. D. Louette, Traditional Management of Seed and Genetic Diversity: What Is a 
Landrace?, in GENES IN THE FIELD: ON-FARM CONSERVATION OF CROP DIVERSITY 109 
(Stephen B. Brush ed., 1999). 
 272. Gollin, supra note 203.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/5
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge 109 
 
 
 
North/South dialog understates the value of global public goods273 
and international cooperation involving both North/South and 
South/South transfers. 
Arguably, it is time to move beyond both the Tragedy of the 
Commons and North/South dialog as bases for developing 
mechanisms to protect traditional agricultural knowledge and crop 
resources. This conclusion is embedded in the negotiated settlement 
of the ITPGRFA that returns to common heritage for the world’s 
most important crops. The weakness of that treaty, however, is that it 
does not give proper emphasis to the obligations of industrial 
countries and developing countries alike to support conservation of 
crop resources beyond funds raised in connection to commercializing 
improved crop varieties. This mechanism faces the same limitations 
as the Indian and OAU gene funds and is likely to be inadequate for 
meeting conservation budgets that are already inadequate.274 Rather, 
benefit sharing must come from a more traditional transfer of 
international capital: development assistance focused on programs to 
improve rural incomes in Vavilov Centers. An assortment of tools 
now exist to use those funds in a way that increases production and 
income without replacing traditional crop populations.275 Bilateral 
and multilateral development assistance that funds rural development 
activities and benefits the stewards of the world’s crop resources can 
be justified as part of the reciprocal obligations of industrial nations 
to developing nations. Multilateral efforts such as the Global 
Environmental Facility’s Program on Conservation and Sustainable 
Use of Biological Diversity Important to Agriculture276 and the 
McKnight Foundation’s Collaborative Crop Research Program277 
embody reciprocity through international financial assistance. The 
irony of this conclusion is that it reverts to tools and principles that 
were established before the assault on common heritage. 
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